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STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC DISCLOSURES, AND HOW 
NOT TO JUDGE THEIR SUCCESS OR FAILURE 
Richard Craswell*  
Abstract: Disclosure laws can serve many different purposes. This Article is the first to 
distinguish two of those purposes, which I call static and dynamic disclosures. In brief, static 
disclosures aim to improve consumers’ choice from among the set of products that are 
already available on the market. By contrast, dynamic disclosures aim to improve the range 
of products from which consumers must choose, by sharpening sellers’ incentives to improve 
the quality of their products. 
The Article also discusses the various ways in which the effects of static and dynamic 
disclosures might be measured and evaluated. In doing so, it examines and mildly criticizes 
the position recently advanced by Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider, who 
argue (approximately) that disclosure almost never works, and that it should not even be 
considered as a policy option. While I agree with much else that Professors Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider say, their claim that disclosures almost never work is far too broad. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this Article I have three ambitions. First, I hope to show that we 
cannot evaluate the success or failure of any disclosure law without 
considering the possible goals that law might have had. I do not take this 
point to be hugely controversial. 
My second ambition, however, is to improve our understanding of 
two particular purposes that disclosures might serve. To this end, I 
distinguish here between what I will call static and dynamic disclosures. 
Static disclosures take a consumer’s existing range of choices as more or 
less given, and aim merely to improve a consumer’s choice from among 
the existing choice set. By contrast, dynamic disclosures seek to improve 
the existing choice set by creating incentives for sellers to improve the 
quality of their offerings. This distinction has not yet been discussed in 
the disclosure literature, but I hope to show that it has important 
implications for how the success or failure of disclosures can best be 
measured. 
Finally, my third ambition is to illustrate the perils of trying to 
analyze disclosure laws without paying attention to the specific purposes 
that different disclosure laws might serve. To illustrate these perils, I use 
as a recurring example the recent and provocative Article, “The Failure 
of Mandated Disclosure,” by Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. 
Schneider.1 It is perhaps unfair to single out this Article in such a way, 
                                                     
1. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 647 (2011). 
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for (as I discuss below) there is much that is good in the Article, and I 
agree with many of its conclusions. However, the systematic way in 
which that Article analyzes a wide range of disclosure laws (which is 
one of the Article’s strengths) also makes it an ideal Article in which to 
find an occasional cautionary example showing what happens when the 
purposes of disclosure laws are not properly understood. 
With that in mind, let us proceed. Section I, below, provides some 
necessary background by describing Professors Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider’s views in slightly more detail, and by relating their Article to 
the rest of the academic literature on disclosures. Sections II and III then 
develop at more length the distinction I wish to draw between static and 
dynamic disclosures, with Section III providing an economic 
interpretation of that distinction. Finally, Sections IV through VI discuss 
in more detail some criteria for evaluating the success or failure of var-
ious kinds of disclosure, to show how those evaluations should differ 
depending on whether the disclosure has static or dynamic aims. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Mandatory disclosure, we are told, is a regulatory technique that is 
“much used but little remarked.”2 However, while I fully agree that 
disclosures are “much used,” the case for them being “little remarked” is 
doubtful. Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider themselves cite dozens 
of studies of the effects of various disclosure regimes; and they could 
easily have added more, had they not worried about overburdening their 
readers.3 For example, mention should certainly be made of the 2007 
book by Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil, which compiled 
eighteen case studies of various disclosure regimes.4 Unlike Professors 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider, these authors came to a more mixed view of 
the efficacy of disclosures (some worked well; others didn’t). Similarly 
mixed views can be found in the marketing literature, in several recent 
survey Articles and meta-analyses.5 
                                                     
2. Id. at 649. 
3. Id. at 652. 
4. ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID K. WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE POLITICS AND 
PERILS OF TRANSPARENCY POLICIES (2007). This book is cited only once, and briefly, by Ben-
Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 679 n.166. 
5. E.g., Jennifer J. Argo & Kelly J. Main, Meta-Analyses of the Effectiveness of Warning 
Labels, 23 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 193 (2004); Anthony D. Cox, Dena Cox & Gregory Zimet, 
Understanding Consumer Response to Product Risk Information, 70 J. MARKETING 79 (2006); Eli 
P. Cox III, Michael S. Wogalter, Sara L. Stokes & Elizabeth J. Tipton Murff, Do Product Warnings 
Increase Safe Behavior? A Meta-Analysis, 16 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 195 (1997); Baruch 
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Indeed, this concern with the possible effects of disclosure (both good 
effects and bad) is not even particularly new. Over thirty years ago, an 
Article in the Journal of Law and Economics began its discussion by 
observing that: 
Consumer protection regulation has come under increasing fire 
from Congress, the courts, and the business community. . . . 
One response to these charges has been a movement away from 
traditional forms of regulation and toward interventions that are 
more compatible with consumer and seller incentives. In partic-
ular, there has been increased interest in techniques which 
ensure that consumers have sufficient information to protect 
themselves against unsafe products or unfair seller behavior. . . . 
[However,] these simple prescriptions . . . mask many of the 
complexities involved in the ways in which information is 
communicated to consumers and the ways that consumers 
(and the market) respond.6 
For all these reasons, I think a better interpretation of the “little 
remarked” comment is that it is a statement about what gets remarked in 
law school classes. On that point, Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider 
are absolutely correct. Most law school curricula allot little if any time to 
issues of how (and whether, and with what effect) consumers’ informa-
tion might be improved. Indeed, I am struck by the fact that today, in 
2013, we still make it very hard for any law student to graduate without 
getting at least a brief exposure to the rule against perpetuities, or to the 
important problems that arise if there are two ships in the world that are 
both named Peerless.7 But it is entirely possible (and not even very 
difficult) to graduate from most law schools today without being 
exposed to any serious study of the costs and benefits of consumer dis-
closures. Thus, even if Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider succeed 
only in bringing this issue to the attention of a new generation of law 
professors, that would be a real contribution. Of course, I hope they will 
succeed in other ways, too—but even if that were all they could do, it 
                                                     
Fischhoff, Donna Riley, Daniel C. Kovacs & Mitchell Small, What Information Belongs in a 
Warning?, 15 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 663 (1998); David W. Stewart & Ingrid M. Martin, 
Intended and Unintended Consequences of Warning Messages: A Review and Synthesis of 
Empirical Research, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 15 (1994); William L. Wilkie, Affirmative 
Disclosure at the FTC: Objectives for the Remedy and Outcomes of Past Orders, 4 J. PUB. POL’Y & 
MARKETING 91 (1985). 
6. Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer 
Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 491 (1981). 
7. If my assertion in the text is accurate, no lawyer or law student is likely to need this citation, 
but I supply it anyway: Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex.). 
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would still be impressive. 
As should by now be apparent, I agree with roughly 85% of what 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider have to say. In particular, I agree 
that disclosure requirements are used too often, are designed by 
institutions with little understanding of their potential pitfalls, and often 
produce small (or even negative) effects. I also agree that the apparent 
attractions of disclosure regimes sometimes offer lawmakers a 
convenient excuse for ducking the more difficult choices they would 
have to face if they were serious about choosing an optimal consumer 
policy. I have written about these issues elsewhere, so I will not repeat 
that analysis here.8 But to the extent that there are “sides” in the debate 
over consumer disclosures, I am mostly on the side of Professors 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider. 
Still, the mutual praise of academics is usually of interest only to the 
individual academics being praised. In an attempt to interest a wider 
audience, in this paper I take up some issues on which I may disagree 
with Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider; or at least (to put it more 
fairly) some issues that were not those authors’ principal focus. 
Specifically, I consider the following questions: By what criteria should 
we judge whether a disclosure succeeded or failed? And should those 
criteria be different for different kinds of disclosure? 
II. THE PURPOSE(S) OF DISCLOSURE 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider do not claim that they know, or 
even that they can estimate, the exact percentage of disclosure laws that 
“fail.” For example, they do not claim that the disclosure laws they 
describe exhaust the entire universe of disclosure laws. Nor do they 
claim their study includes even a random sample from that universe, for 
they explicitly exclude non-mandatory disclosures, which (I will argue 
below) skews their sample in important ways. They also exclude even 
some successful disclosures, without really explaining why.9 
In spite of these limits on their analysis, though, Professors 
                                                     
8. See, e.g., Beales et al., supra note 6; Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: 
Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565 (2006); 
Richard Craswell, “Compared to What?” The Use of Control Ads in Deceptive Advertising 
Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 757 (1997) [hereinafter Craswell, Control Ads]; Richard Craswell, 
Regulating Deceptive Advertising: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 549 
(1991) [hereinafter Craswell, Cost-Benefit Analysis]. 
9. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 678–79 (“We could go on. . . . We could also point 
to some moderate successes of disclosure regimes, particularly those that rely on rating systems. But 
enough. Let us move on . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
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Ben-Shahar and Schneider are not shy about extrapolating from their 
limited sample, leaving readers to believe that disclosures almost always 
fail. At various places in the Article, they claim that disclosure laws 
“regularly” and “chronically” fail, and that the costs of those laws “gen-
erally swamp” their benefits.10 At one point, they even describe the 
failure of disclosure laws as “inevitable”—though they may later retreat 
from that particular description.11 
Moreover, Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider present these 
conclusions not as their own speculations, but as uncontroverted 
empirical fact. For example, the section of the Article where they review 
the empirical evidence is not given some tentative or diffident title, like 
“Some Possible Failures of Mandated Disclosure.” Instead, their section 
heading is emphatic “THE DOCUMENTED FAILURE OF MANDATED 
DISCLOSURE.”12 Elsewhere in their Article, they are even more explicit: 
“the empirical evidence show[s] that mandated disclosure regularly fails 
in practice.”13 As I said at the outset, I happen to agree with Professors 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider that many disclosure laws fail. I do not, 
however, agree with their repeated implications that almost all 
disclosures fail. More fundamentally, I also do not agree that the kinds 
of evidence relied on by Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider are 
sufficient to let us decide whether any particular disclosure law has 
failed. As a result, I cannot agree that their verdict (chronic and all-but-
inevitable failure) is supported by the available empirical evidence. 
At bottom, all of my disagreements with Professors Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider ultimately stem from their failure to defend (or even to 
identify) any criterion for judging the success of a disclosure law. This 
omission is critical, because any conclusion that some disclosure law 
fails must depend, at least implicitly, on the standard we set for judging 
success. Set the bar for success high enough, and every disclosure is a 
failure. Set the bar low enough, and every disclosure succeeds. 
Now, to some readers, and perhaps to Professors Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider, it might seem that the purpose of disclosure laws is obvious; 
and that this purpose is indeed the same for all disclosures across the 
board. After all, disclosure (by definition) is about giving people 
information, and surely one of the main purposes for giving people 
                                                     
10. Id. at 651. 
11. Id. (“Not only does . . . mandated disclosure regularly fail[] in practice, but its failure is 
inevitable”) (emphasis added). But see id. at 679 (disclosure “regularly—though not inevitably” 
fails) (emphasis added). 
12. Id. at 665 (emphasis added). 
13. Id. at 651 (emphasis added). 
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information is to help them make better decisions. When Professors 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider do talk about the possible purposes of 
disclosure laws, this goal—helping people make better decisions—is the 
one they mention most frequently.14 This is a good start, though when it 
is stated at that level of generality, it leaves open a number of 
quantitative questions about where to draw the line. For example, how 
many people must be helped in order for a disclosure to count as a 
success? And how much should we be willing to spend to improve the 
decision making of 14% of consumers? 
In any event, at one point in their Article Professors Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider do recognize that disclosure laws might have other purposes 
in addition to the open-ended goal of helping people make better 
decisions. In particular, they identify at least four possible purposes that 
are sometimes advanced in support of disclosure requirements: 
[Mandated disclosure] rests on a plausible assumption: that 
when it comes to decision-making, more information is better 
than less. More information [1] helps people make better 
decisions, thus [2] bolstering their autonomy. Since people can 
no longer customize most transactions, disclosure [3] helps 
restore some individual control. It may also [4] induce 
enterprises to behave more efficiently.15 
In this paper, I will say little about goals [2] and [3], since the 
application of autonomy theories to disclosure policy is underdeveloped, 
and in any case it is not my area of expertise. But the other two goals, 
numbered [1] and [4] in this list, correspond at least approximately (or 
could be read as corresponding) to what I refer to as static and dynamic 
disclosures. Recall: static disclosures take the options consumers face as 
given, and try to help consumers make a better choice from among those 
options. In the list quoted above, this is item [1]: disclosure that “helps 
[some] people make better decisions.” By contrast, dynamic disclosures 
aim to give sellers better incentives to offer improvements over whatever 
is currently available. In Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s list, this 
is an example of item [4]: disclosures that “induce [some] enterprises to 
behave more efficiently.” 
Of course, these two goals are not the only ones disclosure might 
serve, so this is not meant as an exhaustive list. For example, some dis-
closures aim to explain how to use a product, or tell buyers where to 
return a product if it is defective. Disclosures with either of these goals 
                                                     
14. E.g., id. at 649, 729, 746. 
15. Id. at 650 (numbers added). 
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in mind may look very different from the ones I discuss here, with 
different implications for everything from the timing of the disclosure 
(pre-sale or post-sale?) to what medium ought to be used (package insert 
or a permanent page on the seller’s website?). 
It is also true that any given disclosure might have more than one 
goal. For example, some disclosures might attempt simultaneously to 
improve consumers’ choices from the currently available set (the static 
goal, in my terms); and to give sellers an incentive to improve that set 
(the dynamic goal). Even when disclosures have mixed purposes, 
though, it is still useful to distinguish those goals, for purposes of 
evaluating a disclosure’s success or failure. After all, if different disclos-
ures have a different mix of goals, then the criteria for success or failure 
will usually have to be different too. 
Section III, below, presents a theoretical economic model (the 
technical mathematics of which is left to a short Appendix) to show what 
a disclosure regime would have to do to achieve these two goals, and to 
show why the requirements for success at one goal are not the same as 
the requirements for success at the other. Sections IV and V then discuss 
some concrete examples of disclosures that may or may not have been 
successful, to show how various criteria for success might be applied. 
Finally, Section VI considers a different criterion for success—are the 
disclosure’s dynamic effects strong enough to eliminate the need for 
direct regulation of product quality?—to show how this criterion re-
quires still a different set of inquiries. 
III. SOME SIMPLE ECONOMICS 
Consider a hypothetical market in which sellers produce a relatively 
complex product—an automobile, say, or a wireless Internet router or a 
nonprescription drug. Each of these products has multiple attributes that 
might vary along several dimensions. To keep the analysis simple, 
though, I will focus on a single attribute (s) which could conceivably 
have different values for different brands of the product (that is, some 
sellers’ products may have more s than others’). Those who prefer more 
concreteness can think of s as standing for “safety,” as measured by 
(say) the probability that the product will not have any dangerous 
defects. But the substance of my analysis would still apply if s 
represented some other, non-safety attribute that consumers valued—
“speed,” in the case of a wireless router; or (the absence of) 
“side-effects” for a drug. 
Rather than assuming perfect information, I instead assume that every 
consumer has some estimate—possibly an inaccurate one—of each 
seller’s level of s. I will refer to that estimate as r (for “reputation”). A 
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market with perfect information is thus a market where r is always and 
everywhere equal to s. If some buyers instead overestimated the 
product’s safety, that would imply r > s for those buyers. If buyers 
underestimated the product’s safety (or overestimated its risks), that 
would mean r < s for those buyers.16 
Viewed in these terms, it should be clear that while there is only one 
way to have a market with perfect information (r = s at all times and for 
all consumers), there is an almost infinite number of ways for a market 
to fall short of perfection, by having one or more consumers with r ≠ s. 
As Tolstoy might have said (but didn’t), “markets with perfect informa-
tion are all alike, but every imperfect market is imperfect in its own 
way.”17 This diversity of possible imperfections poses a challenge to 
economists, for there is no theoretical consensus (much less conclusive 
empirical data) on just how closely consumers’ beliefs (r) track the true 
level of any attribute (s).18 
The problem becomes even more complex once we introduce 
disclosures into the picture. To see this, imagine a spectrum of 
disclosures, running from those that disclose very little to those that 
disclose a lot. Let d stand for the quantity of information that sellers 
currently disclose (measured any way you like). We now have two 
questions of interest: (1) How, if at all, are buyers’ estimates of r 
influenced by changes in the true level of safety, s? And (2) how, if at 
all, are buyers’ estimates of r influenced by changes in the quantity of 
disclosure, d? 
Unfortunately, neither question can be answered purely as a matter of 
theory.19 As a result, in this Article I make no assumptions about how 
consumer beliefs get formed, or about the exact way in which those 
beliefs are influenced by either s or d. Instead, I work backwards from 
                                                     
16. In standard economic notation, s and r would each be written with subscripts or 
superscripts—say, rij—to designate the belief that some particular consumer i held about the safety 
produced by some particular seller j. For ease of reading, I have omitted those superscripts here. 
17. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 3 (Leonard J. Kent & Nina Berberova eds., Modern 
Library 1993) (1918) (my paraphrase). 
18. This aspect of the model draws heavily on Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, 
Product Failure, and Producer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977). 
19. For other theoretical models, each making a different assumption about consumer beliefs, 
see for example George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Products 
Liability, Signaling and Disclosure, 164 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 106 (2008); 
Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information 
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505 (2006). Professor Akerlof’s model of the 
“market for lemons” is probably the one that is best known in the legal academy. The Appendix 
discusses some of the similarities between that model and the one I use here. 
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the other end of the problem, by asking what would have to be true 
about the influence of s or d for disclosure to achieve either a static or 
dynamic goal? 
First, consider the goal of static disclosures: disclosures that aim to 
help consumers make better choices from among the products currently 
available on the market. Of course, in most cases consumers have to 
make many different choices—not just whether to buy the product at all, 
but which brand to buy, how much of it to buy, how often (and how 
carefully) to use the product, and so on. To keep the discussion simple, 
though, I will focus on only a single consumer decision: the decision 
about how much of each brand to buy. 
If brands differ in their level of safety, then ideally consumers should 
reserve the riskier brands for use only in extreme cases, when whatever 
benefits the product yields are great enough to outweigh the extra risk. 
However, if consumers have imperfect information, they may not know 
which brands are the riskiest, so they won’t know which brands they 
ought to buy and consume in lower qualities. In particular, if any 
consumers overestimate a brand’s safety (r > s), they will tend to buy 
more of that product than they ideally should. (In a more detailed 
economic model, they might also use the product too frequently, or use it 
less carefully than they should, or make inaccurate decisions in other 
respects as well.) Conversely, if a consumer underestimates a brand’s 
safety (r < s), that consumer will be more cautious than he or she should 
be, and thus will buy too little of that brand. 
The key question for static disclosures, therefore, is whether requiring 
more disclosure (that is, higher values of d) can succeed in nudging 
consumers’ beliefs in the right direction. Borrowing some mathematical 
notation, let ∂r/∂d stand for the actual change in r (if any) that a change 
in d would produce. Obviously, static disclosures could not work if 
∂r/∂d = 0, for that would mean that consumer beliefs were not affected at 
all by disclosures. Instead, for static disclosures to succeed, it would 
have to be the case that ∂r/∂d < 0 for r > s, or possibly ∂r/∂d > 0 for r < 
s. In plain English, static success requires that a disclosure succeed in 
reducing consumers’ estimates of a brand’s safety if their current 
estimates are too high, or possibly increasing consumers’ estimates of a 
brand’s safety if their current estimates are too low. 
While this conclusion might seem obvious, and not worth all this 
mathematical superstructure, my next conclusion may be less so. 
Suppose we turn from static disclosures to dynamic disclosures, 
whose goal is to strengthen sellers’ incentives to improve the mix of 
products that is available on the market. As the Appendix demonstrates, 
sellers’ incentives to produce safer products in the first place do not 
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depend on whether buyers over- or underestimate the absolute levels of 
risks that are offered in equilibrium. In other words, sellers’ incentives to 
improve their level of s do not depend on whether r is greater or less 
than s, either for any individual or for buyers generally. Instead, sellers’ 
incentives to produce better safety (or to make any other improvements 
in product quality) depend on how much buyers’ estimates will change 
in response to any change the seller makes. 
While this conclusion, too, is rarely emphasized in law school classes, 
the intuition behind it is not hard to understand. In a nutshell, if most 
buyers would underestimate the effect of any change in s (that is, if a 
seller’s reputation r changes by less than the change in that seller’s true 
safety level s), this means that any seller who makes such a change will 
not get full credit for it because consumers will underestimate the true 
impact of the change. Obviously, this will reduce sellers’ incentives to 
make such changes in the first place, thus leading sellers to produce 
lower levels of product quality. 
On the other hand, if most buyers overestimate the effect of the 
change (that is, if r tends to change by more than s does), that will 
exaggerate the market rewards for such a change, and will give sellers an 
incentive to make even more improvements than are truly optimal.20 
Thus, the ideal buyer would be one who revised her estimate by exactly 
the same amount as the actual change in the seller’s safety, as this buyer 
would increase her purchases of the seller’s product by exactly the 
amount that the improvement warranted. In mathematical terms, the 
ideal buyer would be one for whom ∂r/∂s was always equal to 1. 
My reason for distinguishing these two aspects of buyers’ information 
is that each is relevant to one (but only one) of the two kinds of dis-
closure I have distinguished. Static disclosures aim to help buyers make 
the best use of any product given the safety currently built into it, 
perhaps by not using that product as often or in inappropriate ways. 
Dynamic disclosures, on the other hand, aim to give sellers the incentive 
to build the right level of safety into their products in the first place. This 
means that static disclosures can succeed only by moving buyers’ estim-
ates, r, closer to the true value, s, so buyers no longer over- or 
underestimate the product’s current level of risks. But dynamic 
disclosures can succeed only by moving ∂r/∂s closer to 1, meaning that 
                                                     
20. For earlier discussions of this point, see Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 6, at 586–87; 
Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 
353, 374–78 (1988); and Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The 
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 710–14 (1999). For a formal 
mathematical model, see the Appendix. 
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they must change the rate at which consumer beliefs change when 
sellers change the true levels of risk. 
Now, it may seem at first as if these two goals should usually overlap. 
That is, it could be the case that buyers who were accurately informed 
about current levels of safety would also be accurately informed about 
any changes in the current levels. In fact, the Appendix shows that this 
would indeed be the case in a world of perfect information. If buyers are 
at all times perfectly informed about the absolute level of any product’s 
risks, for these buyers r would always equal s. Moreover, it follows that 
these buyers will also accurately estimate any change in the level of 
risks, so ∂r/∂s should always equal 1. Thus, if we ever achieve ab-
solutely perfect information, we will not have to worry about the 
distinction between static and dynamic goals. 
All real markets, however, fall to some degree short of perfect 
information. Further, in markets with less than perfect information, it is 
possible for buyers to be well-informed about one of these dimensions, 
but not so well-informed about the other. For example, if buyers would 
under-respond to changes in the level of safety (∂r/∂s < 1), that could 
give sellers an incentive to produce too low a level of safety, for the 
reasons discussed above. If that suboptimal level of safety persisted for a 
long time, however, buyers might well come to expect that level of 
safety, so in equilibrium, r would indeed equal s. It thus is entirely 
possible to have r = s in equilibrium, but ∂r/∂s < 1 for values of s that no 
seller is currently offering, or values of s that are off the equilibrium 
path. 
In addition, in some cases static and dynamic goals may do worse 
than merely fail to coincide. In some cases, the two goals may actually 
conflict, if disclosures that produce positive static effects turn out to 
interfere with the possible dynamic effects (or vice versa). For example, 
suppose that consumers underestimate the health risks of sodium in 
foods; and suppose that, as a result, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) requires all food packages to carry a disclosure reading “Caution: 
High sodium is dangerous to your health.” It is certainly possible that 
such a warning might have a positive static effect—perhaps a very small 
one—on the number of consumers who previously underestimated the 
risks of sodium. But it is also possible that, with every product 
displaying the same health warning, some consumers would then be less 
likely to be aware of any differences in sodium content across different 
foods, or across different brands of the same food. In that event, we 
could have a disclosure that simultaneously improved consumers’ 
understanding of the absolute level of risks (mathematically, moving r 
closer to the true value of s); but also worsened consumers’ sensitivity to 
06 - Craswell Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/11/2013  4:54 PM 
2013] STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC DISCLOSURES 345 
 
any changes or differences in those risks (mathematically, moving ∂r/∂s 
even farther below its ideal value of one). 
The opposite problem is also possible, where dynamic effects can 
interfere with static ones. For example, if the disclosure instead required 
all food manufacturers to disclose their relative sodium content, then it 
might enhance the disclosure’s dynamic effects by steering more bus-
iness toward those sellers whose products were lowest in sodium. At the 
same time, though, it might also lead consumers to think that “low” 
sodium products were actually safer than they really are (“If everybody’s 
making a big deal about low sodium foods, maybe it’s okay for me to eat 
a lot of them.”). In that case, any benefits that were produced by the 
improved dynamic effects would have to be balanced against the costs 
produced by making consumers’ static beliefs less accurate. 
IV. CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS: STATIC DISCLOSURES 
Having distinguished between two of the possible goals of disclosure, 
we can now talk about how to tell whether disclosures succeed or fail at 
those goals. I begin this section with static disclosures, then turn to 
dynamic disclosures in Section V. 
Static disclosures aim to correct buyers’ information about one 
particular fact or feature of a product that is currently available on the 
market. For example, the Surgeon General’s warning that appeared (by 
law) on U.S. cigarette packages had, as one of its goals, improving 
buyers’ information about the health risks associated with smoking. 
Expressed in the notation of the preceding section, this was a case where 
some consumers’ estimates of r were believed to be too high (r > s), 
meaning that these consumers overestimated the safety of smoking. As a 
consequence, one aim of the warning requirement was to reduce some 
consumers’ estimates of r, thereby bringing r and s closer together (or 
bringing consumers’ own beliefs closer to the truth). 
Of course, there are many techniques that might be used to alter 
consumers’ beliefs, as well as many possible legal or doctrinal bases for 
those techniques. Sometimes disclosure is ordered after a finding that the 
seller’s ads would otherwise be false or misleading without the 
disclosure of additional facts, or after a finding that the seller’s previous 
ads had been deceptive.21 In other cases, disclosure is required without 
                                                     
21. Disclosures in this latter category are sometimes referred to as “corrective advertising.” 
Studies of particular instances—which typically show small but non-zero effects on consumer 
beliefs—include Gary M. Armstrong, Metin N. Gurol & Frederick A. Russ, A Longitudinal 
Evaluation of the Listerine Corrective Advertising Campaign, 2 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 16 
(1983); Peter R. Darke, Laurence Ashworth & Robin J.B. Ritchie, Damage from Corrective 
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any finding of deception if Congress passes a statute requiring certain 
information to be disclosed. While these distinctions may be important 
legally, the empirical effect of any disclosure is unlikely to vary based on 
the legal rationale that its drafter had in mind, so I will ignore these 
doctrinal differences here. 
A. Measuring Static Effects 
There are also many different ways to look for the effects of 
advertising (or the effects of any other disclosure) on consumers’ beliefs 
and actions. In most cases, though, researchers do not have data about 
consumers’ eventual purchase decisions, so the dependent variable that 
is most often studied is consumers’ own self-reporting about their 
beliefs, or their own predictions of what product they might purchase. 
Such predictions are not always accurate, of course, but they are usually 
better than nothing. 
The independent variable may also cause problems, since most 
researchers’ budgets do not allow them to fund an $80 million 
advertising campaign in order to see if consumer beliefs would change. 
To be sure, real advertising campaigns can sometimes be used as a 
natural experiment, as when the American Cancer Society introduced its 
own anti-smoking advertisements in the 1960s. But most studies of static 
disclosures take the easier and less expensive approach of using 
laboratory experiments, where each member of a group of subjects is 
artificially exposed to the disclosure being studied—a television ad, a 
consumer brochure, or a product label—and is then asked questions to 
elicit his or her beliefs about the advertised product.22 At the same time, 
similar questions are asked of a control group of subjects who were not 
exposed to that disclosure. If the experiment is properly designed, it may 
be possible to attribute any differences between the two groups to the 
effect of the disclosure itself. 
As this brief description will suggest, questions about generalizability 
arise at nearly every turn. For example, care must be taken to make sure 
that the experimental subjects are similar (in demographic 
characteristics, previous experience with the product, etc.) to the 
                                                     
Advertising: Causes and Cures, 72 J. MARKETING 81 (2008); Michael B. Mazis, FTC v. Novartis: 
The Return of Corrective Advertising?, 20 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 114 (2001); Andrea Heintz 
Tangari, Jeremy Kees, J. Craig Andrews & Scot Burton, Can Corrective Ad Statements Based on 
U.S. v. Philip Morris USA Inc. Affect Consumer Beliefs About Smoking?, 29 J. PUB. POL’Y & 
MARKETING 153 (2010); William L. Wilkie, Dennis L. McNeill & Michael B. Mazis, Marketing’s 
“Scarlet Letter”: The Theory and Practice of Corrective Advertising, 48 J. MARKETING 11 (1984). 
22. For an example of one such study, see infra Section IV.A. 
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consumers whom the disclosure is ultimately aimed at. It is also 
important that the subjects’ exposure to the disclosure message is similar 
to the way they would be exposed in real life. In testing the effects of 
print advertisements, for example, subjects may be given a reprint of a 
short magazine article, which happens to have an advertisement inside 
the front cover of the reprint – but the subjects will not be told until later, 
after they have finished reading the article, that the ad is what they will 
be asked questions about. This allows subjects to either attend to the 
advertisement or not, just as they could if they were reading an actual 
magazine. 
In short, there are many different studies that might be relevant to 
static disclosures, and questions might be raised about any or all of those 
studies. Still, the steady growth of this kind of study (paralleling the 
steady growth of disclosure requirements themselves) seems to be 
leading toward a rough consensus about how such studies should be 
conducted.23 In this Article, rather than describing each of the many 
studies in more detail, I will instead offer four observations that 
summarize what these studies can teach us. 
B. Lessons from the Data 
The first three observations will not be surprising, but they are worth 
stating explicitly. (1) Disclosure never results in 100% of consumers 
holding completely accurate beliefs. (2) Some disclosures result in 
approximately 0% of consumers changing their beliefs. In other words, 
some static disclosures appear to have no effect at all on the goal they 
aim to achieve. (3) Most disclosures fall somewhere between these 
extremes—that is, most have effects that are somewhere between 0% 
and 100%. 
As I said, none of these conclusions is surprising. It would be 
unreasonable to expect any disclosure to alter the beliefs of every 
consumer, for even Madison Avenue does not enjoy that much success. 
Nor is it surprising that some static disclosures appear to have no effect 
                                                     
23. See for example the exchange between the experts who testified on each side of the Federal 
Trade Commission’s suit In re Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 40 (1991): Jacob Jacoby & George J. 
Szybillo, Consumer Research in FTC versus Kraft: A Case of Heads We Win, Tails You Lose, 14 J. 
PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 1 (1995); David W. Stewart, Deception, Materiality and Survey 
Research: Some Lessons from Kraft, 14 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 15 (1995); and Seymour 
Sudman, When Experts Disagree: Comments on the Articles by Jacoby and Szybillo and Stewart, 14 
J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 29 (1995). Other useful discussions include Debra K. Owen & Joyce 
E. Plyler, The Role of Empirical Evidence in the Regulation of Advertising, 10 J. PUB. POL’Y & 
MARKETING 1 (1991); and Janis K. Pappalardo, The Role of Consumer Research in Evaluating 
Deception: An Economist’s Perspective, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 793 (1997). 
06 - Craswell Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/11/2013  4:54 PM 
348 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:333 
 
at all (even Madison Avenue whiffs from time to time). Some of these 
failures involve the disclosure of information that consumers simply 
have no interest in. Others may have been disclosures that were just 
badly designed—an outcome entirely understandable for disclosures de-
signed by government employees, who don’t get Madison Avenue 
salaries, and who tend to lack Madison Avenue’s copy-writing skills. 
Here is a fourth proposition, almost as unsurprising as the first three: 
(4) Most disclosures entail costs. If the disclosure is presented in 
dedicated advertisements of its own, part of the cost will be the cost of 
those ads’ air time or print space. In other cases, though, especially if the 
disclosure is instead made to appear in the targeted company’s own 
advertisements, there may also be an “interference cost” if the required 
disclosure crowds out other information that would itself be useful to 
consumers. Interference costs can result even if the other information is 
still physically present (i.e., is not literally crowded out) but is communi-
cated less effectively now, as a result of having to compete with the dis-
closure for consumers’ attention spans. Indeed, often the very 
disclosures that are most effective (in correcting the false belief we are 
worried about) are also the most costly (in interfering with other beliefs) 
as well. To turn the point around: often the best way to avoid undesirable 
interference effects is to make the disclosure so small, or so unobtrusive, 
that it does not produce any of its intended benefits, either.24 
I emphasize the possibility of both costs and benefits because both are 
crucial in deciding whether any static disclosure has succeeded or failed. 
Of course, if a static disclosure has produced literally no effects, by 
failing to change any consumer’s belief, it should not be controversial to 
label that disclosure a failure. But what about all the static disclosures—
in advertising cases, the vast majority—whose effects fall somewhere 
between 0% and 100%? If, say, only 32% of all current consumers have 
correct beliefs about a particular seller’s level of safety (s); and if, after a 
disclosure is implemented, that number increases only to 37%, is the 
gain of five percentage points enough to call the disclosure a success? Or 
is five percentage points so small that it should really be labeled a 
failure? 
C. Identifying the Costs and Benefits 
Lest these questions seem fanciful, here is an illustration based on a 
                                                     
24. For further discussion of this trade-off, see the exchange between Ivan L. Preston & Jef L. 
Richards, Consumer Miscomprehension and Deceptive Advertising: A Response to Professor 
Craswell, 68 B.U. L. REV. 431 (1988); and Craswell, Cost-Benefit, supra note 8, at 567–72. 
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study by Cornelia Pechmann.25 UPS had advertised its overnight 
delivery service by claiming (among other things) that its rate for 
delivery by 10:30 a.m. the next morning was three dollars less than 
Federal Express’s rate for that service. This was perfectly true, but 37% 
of all subjects who were shown the UPS ad believed that UPS also had 
lower rates for delivery by 5:00 p.m. the next day. This belief was false: 
UPS charged more than FedEx did for delivery by 5:00. 
Professor Pechmann then designed some hypothetical disclosure 
language that potentially could correct consumers’ misimpression about 
which company was cheapest for delivery by 5:00. For instance, one 
version left UPS’s original language intact, but added a disclaimer: 
“Rate comparisons refer only to prices for packages delivered by 10:30 
A.M.” When consumers were shown this version of the ad, only 29% 
formed the incorrect belief that UPS’s rates were lower for delivery by 
any time the next day. This meant that the percentage of consumers who 
were incorrect on this point had been reduced by only eight percentage 
points. (The disclosure was in relatively small print at the bottom of the 
ad, which may be why the size of the reduction was small.) 
If a disclosure reduces consumers’ false beliefs by just eight 
percentage points, should that be considered a success or a failure? In 
answering that question, it may help to know that Professor Pechmann’s 
test also showed a possible interference effect, for the addition of her 
disclosure language (“Rate comparisons refer only to prices for packages 
delivered by 10:30 A.M.”) also reduced the percentage of consumers 
who correctly understood that UPS did indeed have the lower rate for 
10:30 delivery. Specifically, 47% of her subjects formed the correct 
belief about 10:30 a.m. delivery when they were shown the original ad, 
without the disclosure language. However, only 33% of the consumers 
who were exposed to the disclosure ad formed the correct belief about 
10:30 a.m. delivery, which is a decline of fourteen percentage points. In 
other words, Professor Pechmann’s hypothetical disclosure reduced, by 
eight percentage points, the share of consumers who formed one false 
belief (about 5:00 p.m. delivery); but it also increased, by fourteen per-
centage points, the share of consumers who formed a different false 
belief (concerning 10:30 a.m. delivery). By what criteria, then, should 
we judge whether this disclosure succeeded or failed? 
While there are several criteria that might be employed, my own 
suggestion—developed at more length elsewhere26—is to employ a kind 
                                                     
25. Cornelia Pechmann, Do Consumers Overgeneralize One-Sided Comparative Price Claims, 
and Are More Stringent Regulations Needed?, 33 J. MARKETING RES. 150 (1966). 
26. See especially Craswell, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 8; and Craswell, Control Ads, 
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of cost-benefit analysis. That is, the total number (or percentage) of 
consumers who form an incorrect belief is certainly one relevant factor; 
but so too is the seriousness of any consequences they might suffer as a 
result of their false belief. For example, if the best disclosure available 
could only give us a reduction of seven or eight percentage points in the 
number of consumers who held false beliefs about some fatal side effect 
of a drug, that disclosure should still be counted as a success, even if that 
disclosure also produced a very large increase in the share of consumers 
who held incorrect beliefs about some other, less important feature of 
the product. But if the numbers were reversed, a mere eight percent-
age-point reduction in the incidence of a false belief about some 
relatively unimportant product feature might not be enough to count as a 
success. And if that same disclosure also produced an interference effect, 
which increased the number of consumers who held a false belief about 
some other, more important feature, then the disclosure would almost 
surely fail in cost-benefit terms.27 
Of course, in closer cases, the use of cost-benefit analysis may require 
difficult or controversial judgments about the value of competing effects. 
For example, how we value any improvement (or any decline) in the 
accuracy of consumers’ beliefs is a question that cannot be answered by 
mathematical calculations. Instead, it requires a fundamental value 
judgment about the importance of a better- or worse-informed citizenry 
compared to the value of other uses to which the money might otherwise 
have been put. Cost-benefit analysis is a useful way to highlight the 
importance of these value questions, but it does not always provide an 
uncontroversial way of answering them. 
D. Do Static Disclosures Always Fail? 
I will close this section, and my discussion of static effects generally, 
by returning to Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider. As we saw earlier, 
their Article asserts (or strongly implies) that disclosures almost always 
“fail.” Their Article also implies that they are not merely speculating 
about this failure, but that disclosures’ failures have been confirmed by 
empirical evidence, time and time again. 
How might this conclusion be justified? On my view, the best 
evidence would consist of studies of a number of actual disclosures, 
                                                     
supra note 8.  
27. For an argument that this is how the Federal Trade Commission has often exercised its own 
authority over advertising disclosures—though sometimes without explicitly being aware it was 
doing so—see Craswell, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 8. 
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showing (1) the number or percentage of consumers whose views were 
made more accurate by the disclosure, (2) the number or percentage of 
consumers whose views were made less accurate, and (3) the number or 
percentage of consumers whose views were not affected at all. Taking 
those numbers as a starting point, the study should then address the 
question of whether the disclosure’s positive effects were important 
enough to outweigh any costs or negative effects that were present. 
Then, if a number of these studies all showed that the net effects were 
indeed negative, that would provide strong support for Professors 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s pessimism. 
As near as I can tell, however, Professsors Ben-Shahar and Schneider 
do not cite even a single study that attempts to evaluate the costs and 
benefits in this way. To be sure, they cite a good many studies, so it is 
possible that I may have missed one here or there. But going by their 
own descriptions of the studies they rely on, few (if any) of those studies 
even address the question of whether the total cost of some disclosure 
does or does not outweigh any total benefits; and none of the cited 
studies addresses that question and concludes that the net effects were 
negative. 
How, then, can Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider conclude that 
the costs of mandatory disclosures “generally swamp its benefits”?28 
And how can they claim that the empirical evidence proves that 
disclosure “generally fails to achieve its goals”?29 While the structure of 
their argument is not always clear, they seem to place the most weight 
on what can best be described as their own theoretical prediction about 
what is required for the effects of a disclosure to be positive. 
Specifically, Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider assert that no 
disclosure (or almost no disclosure) can be effective unless the parties 
involved successfully navigate “an impossibly long series of unlikely 
achievements,” making the right decision at every step. For example, 
legislatures must (1) correctly identify a problem that needs a regulatory 
solution, and must then (2) correctly decide that mandated disclosure is 
the best regulatory response. Legislatures must also (3) decide just which 
information should be disclosed, as well as (4) design an effective 
enforcement system to make sure those disclosures are carried out.30 
Even then, the disclosure will still not be effective (according to 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider) unless the firms that are required 
                                                     
28. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 651. 
29. Id. at 652. 
30. Id. at 679–91. 
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to disclose (5) correctly understand the legal requirements, figure out 
which information they should disclose, and in what format.31 Finally, 
disclosures will also be ineffective unless the intended audience of the 
disclosures successfully navigate a number of hurdles of their own. In 
particular, disclosures will not work (or so the argument runs) unless 
consumers are able to (6) locate the disclosed information, in whatever 
format it might be disclosed; (7) understand that information; and (8) 
remember that information until they are ready to make a purchase 
decision, or to act on the disclosure in some other way. In addition, if 
consumers are to make the right purchasing decision, they must have 
been able to (9) analyze the information to understand its implications 
for their choice, without being led astray by any heuristics and biases.32 
Viewed in terms of this framework, the claim by Professors 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider that empirical evidence supports their 
conclusions is really a claim about the empirical evidence bearing on 
each of these nine steps addressed individually. That is, some studies 
may show that consumers never even get exposed to the disclosed 
information (step 6), while other studies may show that consumers who 
see the disclosed information do not understand its implications (step 9). 
In this way, Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider can (quite correctly) 
say that there are many, many empirical studies that cast doubt on how 
well each of these nine hurdles is likely to be overcome. And in their 
minds, casting doubt on how well any hurdle is overcome is equivalent 
to showing that the disclosure in question “failed,” because their premise 
is that disclosures cannot possibly succeed unless every hurdle is 
successfully navigated. 
As I have said, though, this premise represents Professor Ben-Shahar 
and Schneider’s own theoretical prediction. That is, as far as I know, 
there has never been any empirical test of the claim that no disclosure 
(or hardly any disclosures) can succeed unless each of those nine steps is 
successfully surmounted. Instead, Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider 
presumably regard this as a matter of simple logic that requires no 
defense or justification. After all, how could a disclosure law possibly 
succeed if, say, consumers didn’t understand the information that was 
disclosed? 
What this simple logic overlooks, however, is that most disclosure 
                                                     
31. Id. at 691–704. 
32. Id. at 704–28. My division of the various steps into nine is to some extent arbitrary, as some 
of them could be combined with others (leaving only seven or eight steps), while others could be 
broken down more finely (leaving ten, eleven, or twelve). However, nothing turns on the exact 
number of different steps, so I will continue to count them as nine. 
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laws (and most of the nine steps or hurdles) can succeed or fail as a 
matter of degree. As the surveys discussed earlier in this section show, 
many disclosure requirements improve the accuracy of some consumers’ 
information, while having no effect (or even a negative effect) on the 
accuracy of other consumers. Indeed, such cases are sufficiently 
common, and the issues that arise in such cases are sufficiently well 
known, that there is even a name for that set of issues: “the n percent 
problem.” Spelled out in more detail, if n represents the percentage of 
consumers whose information has been adversely affected by some 
disclosure, the “n percent problem” is a way of asking how great n 
should have to be in order for the disclosure to be judged a failure.33 
Unfortunately, this is where the simple logic of Professors 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider ceases to be useful, for failing to address one 
version of the n percent problem. Suppose an empirical study shows that 
one of the nine steps is partially satisfied—say, if 80% of consumers do 
not remember the disclosed information (step 8), but 20% of them do. Is 
a 20% memory rate enough to make the disclosure a success? What if 
the memory rate were 30%, or 40%? Once we recognize that disclosures 
can be partial successes or failures—in other words, once we recognize 
that there are plenty of numbers between 0 and 1—we can no longer use 
simple logic to infer what degree of failure with respect to one of the 
nine different steps is enough to make the disclosure as a whole 
unsuccessful. 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider are clearly aware of the 
possibility of intermediate results, for even if the n percent problem was 
not itself widely known, many of the studies they cite do show 
intermediate success rates (i.e., success rates between zero and one). For 
example, they cite studies showing that 90% of consumers don’t 
understand how annual percentage rates (disclosed under the Truth in 
Lending Act) relate to simple annual interest rates.34 Other studies that 
they cite conclude that only 16% of Medicare beneficiaries had adequate 
knowledge to choose between traditional Medicare and an HMO, while 
67% “did not have a good grasp” of the differences between HMO plans 
and traditional fee-for-service arrangements.35 Yet another study, this 
time dealing with food nutrition labels, found that only 22% of 
consumers could correctly calculate the net carbohydrates in two slices 
                                                     
33. For a more extended discussion, including other versions of the “n percent problem” that are 
functionally similar to the one discussed here, see Ivan L. Preston, The Definition of Deceptiveness 
in Advertising and Other Commercial Speech, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1035, 1044–46 (1990). 
34. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 666. 
35. Id. at 673. 
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of low-carb bread.36 
To Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider, it must seem obvious (so 
obvious as to not require any defense) that these studies all give an 
empirical backing to their claim that disclosures rarely if ever work. 
Notice, though, that these same studies could just as well be read to say 
that these disclosures may have improved the information of 10% (i.e., 
one minus 90%), or 16%, or 33%, or 22% of the affected consumers. 
Moreover, most of these studies do not themselves attempt to balance 
the possible offsetting effects to see if the disclosure should be labeled a 
net failure—and neither do Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider. 
Instead, Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider simply ignore most of the 
range between 0 and 1, as if the success of any disclosure (or of any of 
their nine intermediate steps) was always a binary yes/no matter, rather 
than a matter of degree. As a consequence, the lengthy parade of 
evidence that they cite simply does not do what they say it does, for that 
evidence does not yet show that any disclosure with mixed effects has 
failed. 
Of course, there is a possible way to rehabilitate Professors Ben-
Shahar and Schneider’s use of this evidence. If we believed that the 
proper standard for judging any disclosure required a 100% success rate, 
with anything less than that being deemed a failure, Professors Ben-
Shahar and Schneider would then be right to treat every intermediate 
case as a failure as well. As I noted earlier, if the standard for success is 
set high enough then every disclosure will “fail,” and that may be what 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider are implicitly (or subconsciously) 
doing here. But if that is in fact what they are doing, then they are using 
a crazy standard; one that, at the very least, would require some 
argument in its justification. In any event, the very possibility of such an 
absurd standard for success provides further support for the main point 
of this paper, which I identified in Section I. That is, it is always a bad 
idea to try to evaluate disclosures without being careful and explicit 
about what would count as a disclosure’s success. 
V. CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS: DYNAMIC DISCLOSURES 
I now turn to the criteria for evaluating dynamic disclosures, or 
disclosures that aim to improve the average quality of the products 
available on the market. To see whether that goal was achieved, we need 
good measurements (both before and after the disclosure) of the average 
                                                     
36. Id. at 676. I address the related question of whether consumers’ ability to make such 
calculations is even necessary for a disclosure to work in notes 50–53 and the accompanying text. 
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quality of products sold on the market to see whether the average quality 
improved. Unfortunately, though, this data is not always available. And 
even when good data is available, it may still be hard to tell whether the 
improvement in product quality (if any) was caused by the disclosure, or 
by some other causal factor that happened to change at the same time. 
In this section of the Article, I address these and other difficulties in 
more detail. Section V.A tries to make the discussion more concrete by 
describing four industries in which dynamic disclosures have been (or 
could have been) implemented. Section V.B then elaborates on the 
difficulties scholars have had in evaluating the effects of dynamic 
disclosures. In the end, I conclude that at least some of the disclosures 
described in Section V.A probably did succeed. However, I also suggest 
that the evidentiary and other difficulties should make us skeptical of 
anyone who claims that dynamic disclosures always produce a particular 
result. In other words, we should be skeptical of anyone who claims that 
dynamic disclosures always succeed, but we should be equally skeptical 
of those who imply that dynamic disclosures always (or nearly always) 
fail. 
A. Some Examples 
1. Credit Contract Scores 
To make the discussion less abstract, it will help to have in mind 
some actual examples of dynamic disclosures, before discussing how to 
evaluate their success. In this spirit, I begin with an example that was 
never actually put into effect, though it may still have something to teach 
us. In the 1980s, before the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) decided to 
prohibit certain debt collection practices, it at one point considered the 
feasibility of a disclosure requirement instead. For example, the FTC 
might simply have required each lender to disclose any terms of its 
standard loan contract that bore on that lender’s collection practices.37 
Alternatively (and more ambitiously), the FTC might even have rated 
creditors’ consumer loan contracts to come up with a numerical index 
for each creditor, based on factors like whether the loan contracts 
required debtors to pay the creditor’s attorney’s fees, or whether they 
required debtors to confess judgment in advance of any dispute. 
Conceivably, disclosure of each creditor’s numerical score might have 
made it easier for borrowers to shop around for their loans, and that, in 
                                                     
37. FTC Trade Regulation Rule: Credit Practices, 49 Fed. Reg. 7740-01, 7745–47 (Mar. 1, 1984) 
(Statement of Basis and Purpose). 
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turn, might have led some creditors to try to improve their numerical 
rating. 
However, the FTC decided that lenders would be unlikely to compete 
for business along this dimension, because of an adverse selection 
problem.38 That is, if a favorable score succeeded in signaling to 
borrowers that one creditor was more lenient toward its delinquent 
debtors, that creditor might then attract mostly the worst credit risks: 
those who knew they were likely to default, and therefore had the most 
reason to be concerned about each creditor’s debt-collection practices. In 
the end, the FTC decided to directly prohibit what it saw as the most 
egregious collection practices (in other words, direct quality regulation 
rather than disclosure), while requiring no disclosure at all about the 
collection practices that it decided not to ban.39 
In this example, then, there are theoretical reasons to expect that 
dynamic disclosures would not have succeeded in improving the 
collection practices of the average lender on the market. However, 
because this disclosure regime was never adopted, there is no way to be 
certain what its effects would have been. 
2. Restaurant Grades 
A second example involves restaurant health and sanitation grades in 
Los Angeles County and elsewhere. Like the “creditor index ratings” 
described above, restaurant grades attempt to combine a number of 
attributes into a single letter grade ranging from A to C. Proponents of 
the system hoped both that the grades would let consumers make a better 
choice from among existing restaurants (a static goal), and that they 
would encourage restaurants to compete to improve their grades (a dy-
namic goal). According to some measures, the Los Angeles program 
may have achieved that dynamic effect, producing a reduction by as 
much as 20% in the number of hospitalizations for food-borne 
illnesses.40 
Others, though, have questioned the robustness of that finding.41 More 
                                                     
38. Id. at 7747. 
   39. Compare Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 681 (quoting another FTC decision as 
evidence that lawmakers have bought into “[t]he more-information-is-better mantra”). 
40. Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from 
Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 Q.J. ECON. 409 (2003). Professors Ben-Shahar & Schneider 
discuss this example briefly and interpret it as a case of disclosure succeeding at its goal. Ben-
Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 743. 
41. Clifford Winston, The Efficacy of Information Policy: A Review of Archon Fung, Mary 
Graham, and David Weil’s “Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency,” 46 J. ECON. 
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recently, Daniel Ho examined the effects of restaurant grading programs 
in New York, San Diego, and several other cities, finding basically no 
positive effect in any of them.42 In other words, the combined results of a 
number of studies of restaurant grades can only be described as “mixed.” 
Possibly this means that restaurant grades have sometimes been effective 
(as in Los Angeles) but not always (as in other cities). Or possibly it 
means that the difficulty of assessing changes in average restaurant 
sanitation means that, at the present state of our knowledge, we cannot 
yet determine where restaurant grades have been successful and where 
they are not. In other words, possibly the success of restaurant grades 
has been mixed, or possibly it is only our data that is mixed—but neither 
interpretation supports an assertion that restaurant grades never (or 
almost never) work. 
3. Automobile Fuel Economy Ratings 
My third example involves the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) rating of automobile fuel economy, in terms of miles driven per 
gallon of gas.43 This, too, is a composite statistic, reflecting a variety of 
different driving habits and conditions. In fact, average fuel economy did 
steadily improve following the introduction of the EPA ratings, which 
might indicate a dynamic effect of the disclosures.44 The principal 
complication here is that at least some of this improvement may have 
been caused by other factors, including (a) direct quality regulation, 
which required manufacturers to improve the overall fuel economy of 
their fleet, and (b) the imposition of higher taxes on certain low-
economy vehicles. I will return to this issue later, in Section V.B.3, 
when I discuss causation issues more directly. 
                                                     
LITERATURE 704 (2008). 
42. Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 
YALE L.J. 574 (2012). I discuss Professor Ho’s study at more length infra in Section V.D. 
43. For the most recent ratings, see U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Model Year 2013 Fuel Economy Guide (2013). 
44. See Model Year 2013 Fuel Economy Guide (presenting figures for fuel economy in the model 
year 2013) cited supra in note 43; and U.S. Department of Energy & U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Model Year 1999 Fuel Economy Guide (presenting figures for fuel economy in the model 
year 1999). For data from earlier years going all the way back to 1978, see U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
Download Fuel Economy Data, FUELECONOMY.GOV, 
http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/download.shtml (last visited May 20, 2013) (providing links to 
data from earlier years going back to 1978). 
06 - Craswell Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/11/2013  4:54 PM 
358 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:333 
 
4. The Cigarette “Tar and Nicotine Derby” 
A fourth example comes from the history of cigarette advertising.45 
Beginning in the early 1950s, there were several periods when 
Consumer Reports and/or Reader’s Digest collected and published 
information on the levels of “tar” and nicotine delivered by each brand 
of cigarette. (The federal government did not begin its own tar and nico-
tine testing until 1967.) There were also some periods when cigarette 
manufacturers themselves were allowed to emphasize their brand’s tar 
and nicotine levels in their advertising, if they chose to; and other 
periods when this was forbidden. 
Perhaps significantly, some researchers have found that average tar 
and nicotine levels declined rapidly during those periods when tar and 
nicotine information was readily available to consumers. By contrast, tar 
and nicotine levels declined much more slowly—or, in some cases, not 
at all—during periods when that information was not as readily avail-
able.46 To be sure, some of these changes may have been due to other 
factors; and some of the disclosures might better be described as 
voluntary rather than mandatory. I will discuss the possible significance 
of this distinction in Section V.B.3. 
5. Food Labeling and Salad Dressing 
Finally, my last example involves nutritional labels on foods, as re-
quired by the 1990 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA).47 
Prior to passage of the NLEA, makers of low-fat salad dressings had 
often disclosed their calories and fat content voluntarily, to trumpet their 
own brand’s advantage in that regard. However, after the NLEA re-
quired sellers of high-fat foods to disclose information about their 
brands, too, the market share of high-fat dressings began to decline, 
while the market share of low-fat dressings began to rise.48 
In other words, in this case too the disclosure seems (at first glance) to 
                                                     
45. For an overview of the long and colorful history of tobacco regulation, see SUSAN WAGNER, 
CIGARETTE COUNTRY: TOBACCO IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND POLITICS (1971). The specific 
disclosure issues that I discuss in the text are described in more detail in John E. Calfee, Cigarette 
Advertising, Health Information, and Regulation Before 1970 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of 
Econ., Working Paper No. 134, 1985); John E. Calfee, The Ghost of Cigarette Advertising Past, 
REGULATION,  Nov./Dec. 1986, at 35; and Robert McAliffe, The FTC and the Effectiveness of 
Cigarette Advertising Regulations, 7 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 49 (1988).  
46. See for example the two studies by Calfee supra cited in note 45. 
47. Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006)). 
48. Alan Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An Analysis of 
the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J. L. & ECON. 651 (2000). 
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have produced a dynamic change, by improving the average quality of 
salad dressings available on the market. But to decide whether this 
change was an improvement, and to decide whether the disclosures 
actually contributed to the change, we need to look at these examples 
more closely. 
B. Evaluating Success or Failure 
1. Gathering the Data 
As I am using the term, dynamic disclosures aim to improve the 
average quality of the products that are available in the market. This 
means that the data required to evaluate a dynamic disclosure will be 
very different than the data available for static disclosures. As Section 
IV.A discussed, static disclosures can be studied experimentally in a 
laboratory, by exposing typical consumers to the disclosure and then 
seeing whether their beliefs changed as a result. By contrast, laboratory 
measures of consumer beliefs will not normally tell us whether a 
disclosure produced any dynamic effects, because dynamic effects 
require us to know how sellers responded (if at all) to any change in 
buyers’ beliefs, and to know what new equilibrium resulted from sellers’ 
combined responses. Unfortunately, though, it is hard to simulate the 
behavior of entire markets in a laboratory setting, so most studies of 
dynamic disclosures rely on a relatively small number of “natural experi-
ments.” What researchers look for, though cannot always find, are cases 
where there is good data about the average level of quality that sellers 
produced before and after the introduction of some new disclosure. If 
sellers’ average quality did in fact improve during that period, we can 
then proceed to try to determine how much of that improvement (if any) 
was caused by the newly-introduced disclosure. 
Unfortunately, if researchers fail to distinguish between dynamic and 
static effects, they will almost surely fail to gather the right kind of data 
for the kind of effect they are evaluating. A convenient example can be 
found in Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s comments on the food 
nutrition labels that were introduced by the NLEA.49 Recall that when 
Professor Alan Mathios studied the effects of that disclosure, he found 
that the market shares of high-fat salad dressing declined (and the 
market shares of low-fat dressings rose) after the introduction of 
nutritional labels. In other words, Professor Mathios found some 
evidence of a dynamic effect, in which the average fat content of all 
                                                     
49. This disclosure program was described in the text supra at note 48. 
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salad dressings on the market improved. 
In response, Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider argue that the 
evidence is actually “mixed.”50 They do not, however, mean that the data 
is mixed with respect to high-fat dressings’ market shares, which was 
the dynamic effect that Professor Mathios was studying. Instead, what 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider actually argue (though apparently 
without realizing it) is that there is data that might be relevant to 
showing that NLEA food labels may not have succeeded at a static goal. 
Here is their argument, which is worth quoting at length: 
Another study discovered that people infrequently consult 
nutrition labels, and that those who do often find it difficult to 
comprehend and use the information provided. Subjects in the 
study particularly struggled when trying to gauge whether 
nutrient contents comprised a “low, medium, or high amount.” 
Likewise, a review of 103 studies “found that although some 
consumers could understand some of the information on nutri-
tion labeling, in general they reported finding nutrition labeling 
confusing, especially the use of some technical and numerical 
information.” . . . So, for example, when 200 patients were 
asked twenty-four questions about actual labels, only 22% of 
them “could determine the amount of net carbohydrates in two 
slices of low-carb bread, and only 23% could determine the 
amount of net carbohydrates in a serving of low-carb 
spaghetti.”51 
Now, if nutrition disclosures were intended to provide basic consumer 
education, by teaching consumers the rudiments of nutrition, these 
studies might be strong evidence that the disclosures had failed that 
purpose. These studies might also be evidence of failure at what I would 
call a static purpose—for example, if the nutrition disclosures had been 
intended to correct the mistaken beliefs of consumers who over- or 
underestimate the amount of net carbohydrates in currently available 
brands of low-carb bread or low-carb spaghetti.52 In such a case, it might 
be disappointing to learn that only 22% or 23% of consumers now held 
accurate beliefs, even after the disclosures were put into effect. Even in 
that case, though, if we were trying to achieve static goals, we would 
still need to decide whether correcting the views of 22% or 23% of 
                                                     
50. Ben-Shahar and Schneider, supra note 1, at 675. 
51. Id. at 675–76 (footnotes omitted). 
52. Note that each of the studies cited by Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider used experimental 
techniques, with consumer responses to surveys as their dependent variable. As discussed in Section 
IV.A, this is a perfectly appropriate method for evaluating the effects of static disclosures. 
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consumers was worth the costs associated with that correction. Oddly, 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider do not discuss this cost-benefit 
trade-off at all. 
Be that as it may, in this section of the Article my concern is not with 
static goals but with the dynamic goals of disclosure—that is, with 
whether the disclosures improved the general nutrition of products 
available on the market, so that consumers had a healthier set of options 
from which to choose. Success or failure at that goal cannot be 
determined merely by asking how many consumers understand some 
topic or phrase. Instead, dynamic disclosures require us to look at how 
the market actually responds to consumers’ perhaps imperfect 
understanding—that is, did the nutrition level of products available on 
the market actually improve? 
To put the point slightly differently, it may well be true that many 
consumers do not understand technical nutrition terms like “net 
carbohydrates.” It may also be true that many consumers do not know 
what kind of net carbohydrate score would be high, medium, or low. But 
I suspect it is equally true that many consumers could not tell you what 
chemical compounds are measured in cigarette tar and nicotine ratings, 
or what an average rating might be. Nor could many automobile buyers 
explain exactly how the EPA’s “highway” and “city” miles-per-gallon 
(mpg) ratings are measured. For example, how many times must the auto 
being tested be stopped, and then restarted, while the test is going on? 
And how many of those stops should be “cold restarts,” in which the 
engine is allowed to cool down before the car is restarted? 
My point, of course, is that consumers don’t always need to 
understand the underlying science in order for ratings to have a dynamic 
effect. Indeed, this was the entire point of distinguishing between static 
and dynamic effects (this paper’s very raison d’être!), as well as the 
point of the mathematics presented earlier in section III. To recapitulate 
that analysis: achieving dynamic success, or improving the products 
available on the market, does not require that consumers become more 
accurately informed about the absolute level of some product attribute or 
risk (in mathematical terms, it does not require r = s). Instead it requires 
only that consumers more accurately perceive any change in a product’s 
attributes (in mathematical terms, it requires ∂r/∂s = 1). And because 
dynamic and static disclosures have different requirements for success, 
failure at one of those goals does not necessarily imply failure at the 
other. 
A similar failure to distinguish between static and dynamic goals 
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limits the brief discussion by Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider of 
the possible effects of cigarette disclosures.53 The authors focus on what 
may well be the most important effect—whether the disclosures reduced 
the overall quantity of smoking—and they note the very real difficulty of 
distinguishing the effects of disclosures from the effects of all the other 
changes that have affected smoking, such as public education 
campaigns, or taxes on cigarettes, or other anti-smoking legislation. (I 
return to these difficulties at more length in the following subsection.) 
For now, my only point is that achieving reductions in the overall 
level of smoking is a static goal. It takes the safety of existing cigarettes 
as given, and aims only to get consumers to choose the proper level of 
consumption given the existing products’ safety. A dynamic goal, by 
contrast, aims to improve the quality or safety of the products available 
on the market; in this case, by reducing tar and nicotine levels. I do not 
claim that dynamic effects are necessarily superior to static effects, for 
that is surely not the case here (after all, even low-tar cigarettes are still 
dangerous). My claim is merely that dynamic effects are different from 
static effects, as each depends for its success on different factors. And 
since Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider did not consider the possible 
dynamic goals that tar and nicotine disclosures might have achieved, 
they cannot be said to have shown that those disclosures were a dynamic 
failure. 
2. Eliminating Exogenous Causes 
We have seen, then, that dynamic disclosures will usually have to be 
assessed using real-world data about the average quality in the market as 
a whole. However, once we leave the laboratory for the real world, we 
encounter additional problems. For one thing, real-world markets are 
influenced by all kinds of factors, not just disclosures. Thus, even if 
market data shows that average quality did indeed improve, we cannot 
always be sure whether that improvement was due to the disclosures, or 
whether it was due to some other change that was taking place at the 
same time. 
Indeed, this difficulty is especially likely to arise when we are 
studying disclosure laws. At bottom, the problem is that lawmakers 
rarely enact disclosure requirements unless the public has already 
become concerned about some issue. But if the public has, in fact, be-
come more concerned about some issue, it is always possible that any 
subsequent change in the products available on the market will have 
                                                     
53. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 734. 
06 - Craswell Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/11/2013  4:54 PM 
2013] STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC DISCLOSURES 363 
 
been caused by the public’s heightened concerns, not by the newly-
enacted disclosure. In other words, the apparent coincidence in time be-
tween the disclosure and the change in products available on the market 
may be merely a spurious correlation. 
Still, some natural experiments are more problematic than others in 
this respect. In the case of salad dressing disclosures, public interest in 
nutrition and health grew steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s, so if 
public concern alone was enough to get sellers to improve their products, 
we ought to have seen improvements in salad dressings even before the 
NLEA was passed in 1990. To an extent, this is what Professor Mathios 
found: high-fat salad dressings were slowly losing market share even 
before the NLEA went into effect.54 However, Professor Mathios also 
found that the market share of high-fat salad dressings subsequently 
began to fall at a much steeper rate—and this steeper decline began not 
in 1990, when the NLEA was passed, but four years later, in 1994. This 
is consistent with that decline being produced by NLEA’s disclosure 
requirements, since 1994 was the year that those requirements finally 
went into effect (after the FDA finished its implementing regulations). 
To be sure, it is always possible that there was some other exogenous 
spike in 1994, one that had nothing to do with the disclosure laws. So 
far, though, no plausible candidate for that 1994 spike has been 
identified. 
The cigarette tar and nicotine disclosures provide another good 
example, both of the difficulty of testing causation, and of how those 
difficulties can sometimes be overcome. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
when tar and nicotine disclosures were introduced (and sometimes were 
subsequently withdrawn), there were many other changes that affected 
the cigarette market more profoundly than when the market for salad 
dressings was altered in the 1990s. In the case of cigarettes, the other 
influences include everything from higher taxes and better medical 
studies linking smoking to lung cancer, to (eventually) a massive re-
alignment of public attitudes toward smoking in general.55 Thus, if we 
knew only that average tar and nicotine levels declined during that 
period, it would be a real challenge to know how much (if any) of that 
decline was due to increased disclosure of tar and nicotine, and how 
much was due to these other, more fundamental changes. 
In the case of tar and nicotine levels, though, we know more than that. 
For one thing, we know that the underlying public attitudes changed 
                                                     
54. Mathios, supra note 48. 
55. See sources cited supra note 45. 
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more or less steadily throughout this period, without ever reversing 
themselves. Fortunately for scholars, though, the applicable disclosure 
rules were not at all steady. Instead, they changed several times during 
this period, ranging from non-mandatory disclosures in popular 
magazines (roughly 1950 to 1954); to no disclosure at all (1954 to 
1957); to non-mandatory disclosures again, this time mostly in cigarette 
advertisements (1958 to 1960); back to another period of no disclosure 
(1960 to 1963); and eventually to mandatory disclosures of varying 
kinds (1964 to the present).56 Significantly, tar and nicotine levels 
typically declined in the years when some form of disclosure was 
permitted (or required), but typically stopped declining when those 
disclosures were prohibited or discontinued. Given such a back-and-
forth pattern, it is hard to attribute both changes—that is, the declines in 
tar and nicotine during the disclosure years, and the subsequent leveling 
off of those declines in years when disclosure was absent—to long-term 
changes in the public’s attitudes toward smoking, unless we think that 
those long-term changes themselves reversed direction every three or 
four years. A more parsimonious explanation of the difference in market 
tar and nicotine levels (the difference between disclosure years and non-
disclosure years, that is) suggests that the disclosures themselves had 
some causal effect. 
Finally, even when the change in market behavior has clearly been 
influenced by factors other than disclosure, that does not mean that the 
disclosure had no effect at all. The automobile mpg example illustrates 
this point, for at least part of the increase in average fuel economy is 
surely due both to changes in the marketplace (i.e., fuel prices were high, 
so consumers had more reason to consider high-mileage cars) and to 
other legal regulations. In particular, the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act imposed a legal requirement that auto manufacturers 
improve the average fuel efficiency of their entire fleet of cars;57 and the 
Energy Tax Act of 1978 penalized low-mileage cars in another way, by 
subjecting them to higher taxes.58 As a consequence, manufacturers 
already had plenty of other incentives to improve their fuel economy, so 
we cannot simply assume that any improvement must have been due to 
the disclosures of mpg ratings. 
However, it would be equally unjustified to simply assume that all of 
the improvement in average fuel economy was due to these other factors, 
                                                     
56. See sources cited supra note 45. 
57. 49 U.S.C. § 32902 (Supp. V. 2011). 
58. 26 U.S.C. § 4064 (2006). 
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and none of it was due to the disclosures. Even if we somehow knew 
that the disclosures contributed only 2% of the improvements in fuel 
economy, that would still count as a positive contribution, perhaps 
enough of a contribution to prevent us from saying that these disclosures 
had “failed.” In other words, the test for “success” (where dynamic 
disclosures are concerned) cannot require that every bit of any 
subsequent quality improvement must have been caused by the 
disclosure alone. Instead, as long as the disclosure contributed something 
to the improvements in market quality, that should count as a positive 
benefit whenever net success or failure is being assessed. 
Indeed, in the fuel economy example, we have relatively good 
evidence that the changes in average fuel efficiency were not caused 
entirely by exogenous factors. If the exogenous factors—the taxes, the 
federal fleet requirements, and so on—had been enough by themselves to 
determine the resulting market equilibrium, there would have been no 
need for car makers to spend advertising dollars to play up their own 
high-mileage models. After all, even advertising is a form of disclosure, 
in the sense that it represents an attempt (not always successful) to 
convey information and other messages to the target audience. To be 
sure, advertising is usually a voluntary rather than a legally mandated 
disclosure,59 but the very fact of its being voluntary lets us draw at least 
a limited inference from the auto manufacturers’ own choices. That is, 
car manufacturers apparently believed that it was worth it (to them) to 
spend money on this private or voluntary disclosure, so obviously the car 
manufacturers did not believe that their disclosures inevitably failed. In 
other words, even when consumer decisions are already affected by lots 
of other, more influential factors, there can still be some causal role for 
changes in the mix of information that consumers are exposed to. 
3. Isolating the Effect of the Legal Requirements 
The previous subsection’s discussion of “voluntary disclosures” raises 
an important point, for in practice it is very common to find voluntary 
and mandatory disclosures coexisting in the same market. The 
automobile mpg ad campaigns provide one example, for manufacturers 
were required to disclose their mpg ratings only on their cars’ sales 
sticker (a mandatory disclosure).60 In addition, however, manufacturers 
were free to say what they liked about fuel economy in their 
advertisements, and some manufacturers chose to say a good deal (a 
                                                     
59. I discuss this distinction at more length in the following subsection. 
60. See 49 U.S.C. § 32908(b)(1) (2006). 
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voluntary disclosure). 
A similar mixture of mandatory and voluntary disclosures was also 
present in both the cigarette and the food nutrition examples. The NLEA 
is partly mandatory, for it tells sellers what they must say on their labels, 
and in what format they must say it (a mandatory disclosure). Like auto 
manufacturers, though, sellers remain free to give their nutritional 
information even more publicity in their print and TV ads, and many 
manufacturers did exactly that (a voluntary disclosure).61 The cigarette 
example is more complicated, as the mandatory aspect of cigarette 
disclosures changed several times during the period in question, and in 
some years cigarette manufacturers were indeed barred from saying 
anything more about tar and nicotine.62 In other years, however, 
manufacturers were entirely free to say more than what was minimally 
required. In those years (not surprisingly), companies whose cigarettes 
scored low in tar and nicotine were happy to display that fact in their 
ads, giving it far greater prominence than was required by any 
government mandate.63 
In these cases, therefore, the coexistence of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures can make it hard to know how much of any dynamic effects 
were produced by the mandatory disclosures, and how much were 
produced by the sellers’ own voluntary efforts. Of course, from one 
standpoint it might not matter which form of disclosure was responsible 
for the dynamic effects: perhaps all that matters is that those dynamic 
effects were in fact achieved. Still, Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider 
titled their Article “The Failure of Mandatory Disclosure” (emphasis 
mine). This suggests that they might be perfectly willing to concede that 
voluntary disclosures (like advertising) could be effective, while still 
asserting that mandatory disclosures almost always fail. And from a 
policy standpoint, if it were true that the only benefits from disclosure 
were all produced by voluntary disclosures, that might argue that the 
government should never require disclosures. Instead, on this view, the 
only sensible policy for the government to take toward disclosure would 
be to get out of the way, relying thereafter on advertisers’ own voluntary 
                                                     
61. See Mathios, supra note 48. 
62. See supra text accompanying notes 57–59. 
63. I will mention in passing that, historically, the low-tar cigarette manufacturers (who 
emphasize tar and nicotine ratings in their advertising) have usually been fringe firms or new 
entrants who were challenging the larger and more established tobacco companies (whose 
advertising usually ran more to beautiful women, rugged cowboys, or cool mountain lakes). Calfee, 
supra note 45. Compare Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 738 (predicting that the fixed 
costs of complying with disclosure laws will “hurt[] small companies trying to enter and compete in 
the market”). 
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disclosures to give us all the benefits that disclosures can possibly 
provide. 
There are, however, two problems with positing such a fundamental 
difference between voluntary and mandatory disclosures. The first 
problem is that Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider have given no 
reason why voluntary and mandatory disclosures should be expected to 
differ in such a fundamental way. To the contrary, almost all of the 
reasons that Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider offer when they argue 
that mandatory disclosures can hardly ever be effective imply with just 
as much force (or nearly as much force) that voluntary disclosures will 
not be effective, either. 
For example, consider the “quantity” problem that Professors Ben-
Shahar and Schneider identify as one of the main theoretical reasons 
why they expect mandatory disclosures to fail.64 In their view, 
consumers are overwhelmed by all the disclosures they are bombarded 
with, to the point where most consumers would be unable to make good 
use of those disclosures even if they wanted to. Professors Ben-Shahar 
and Schneider also emphasize the cognitive limitations that consumers 
are subject to, which may further reduce the amount of information they 
can process.65 While I agree that these limits are real, I see no reason to 
limit their effects to consumers’ receptiveness to mandatory disclosures. 
Rather, it seems to me that if consumers are so overwhelmed with 
information that they cannot usefully take in any more, that limit should 
reduce the effectiveness of voluntary and involuntary disclosures alike. 
In any event, the second problem with the argument that “voluntary 
disclosures will produce all the benefits that are there to be attained” is 
that neither theory nor data supports this prediction. At least as a matter 
of economic theory, there are several reasons to think that markets for 
information (even more than other markets) will not always work 
perfectly.66 As a matter of empirical observation, it is not hard to find 
cases where sellers were unable to promote some attribute effectively 
until a disclosure requirement was introduced, at least in a quasi-volun-
tary way (if not stronger). In the market for salad dressings, for instance, 
makers of low-fat dressings could and did promote their own dressings 
even before passage of the NLEA. But those promotions did not have 
nearly as much effect on the market shares of high-fat dressings until 
after the NLEA made information about the fat content of all brands 
                                                     
64. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 686–91. 
65. Id. at 719–29. 
66. For more extended discussions of this point, see Beales et al., supra note 6, at 501–03, and 
Fung et al., supra note 4, at 30–33. 
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publicly available for use by consumers or by competing advertisers.67 In 
these cases, then, mandated and voluntary disclosures may be not so 
much substitutes as complements, meaning that the adoption of 
mandatory disclosure rules may increase (rather than decrease) the 
amount and the effectiveness of voluntary disclosures. 
Why might the adoption of mandatory disclosures have this effect? 
This is one of the least-studied aspects of disclosure, so conclusive 
answers are unattainable. However, several possibilities have been 
suggested in the literature. For example, in some industries there may be 
no commonly-accepted method of measuring product quality, and it may 
be in no single seller’s interest to construct one.68 If different sellers use 
different measurements—for example, if different auto companies 
measure mpg in different ways or under different conditions—that may 
make it hard for consumers to make apples-to-apples comparisons when 
evaluating different makes of cars. In addition, the widespread use of 
different measurement systems may also slow the rate at which 
consumers become familiar with any one of those systems. But if the 
government were to require sellers to use one single way of measuring 
fuel efficiency (as the EPA has done), over time that might increase 
consumers’ understanding of the particular metric that was adopted. 
Another possibility is that, when the government requires the 
disclosure of information, that decision itself signals to (some) 
consumers that the issue is important enough to worry about, thus 
making sellers’ later voluntary disclosures more salient to consumers 
than they would have been if the government had not acted. Still another 
possibility is that when information is disclosed voluntarily, consumers 
may not always trust the advertiser who provides it. Some may fear the 
advertiser is telling outright lies; others may simply worry that the 
advertiser (without actually lying) has managed to exploit imperfections 
in the measuring system, thus making his own brand look better than it 
really is.69 In these cases, if the government itself is the one who devises 
the measurement system and who conducts the tests, some consumers 
may be more willing to rely on the resulting information. 
More generally, once we consider all the different roles that the 
                                                     
67. Mathios, supra note 48. 
68. For more extensive discussions of the “public good” aspect of many disclosures, see Beales et 
al., supra note 6, at 503–05, and Fung et al., supra note 4, at 30–33. 
69. For a recent allegation that Hyundai has in fact misstated its mpg ratings, see Harvey 
Rosenfield, Hyundai – False Advertising of Miles Per Gallon (MPG), CONSUMER WATCHDOG, 
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/case/hyundai-false-advertising-miles-gallon-mpg (last visited 
May 10, 2013). 
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government might play, we can see that the simple distinction between 
voluntary and mandatory disclosures does not exhaust the spectrum of 
possibilities.70 In some cases, for example, the government might 
announce a standardized method for measuring fuel economy (thus 
solving any difficulties in coordinating on a single measure), without 
actually requiring anybody to disclose that measurement (thus leaving it 
to firms who score well on that measure to handle all the publicizing). 
Other possibilities involve triggered requirements—for example, if 
sellers are not required to say anything at all about fuel economy; but if 
they do make fuel economy claims, they must use the government’s 
approved method for measuring fuel economy. Still another possibility 
would be to mandate disclosure during a short initial period (while 
sellers and consumers got accustomed to that information), but then turn 
it into a purely voluntary disclosure at the end of two or three years. 
As should be apparent, none of these examples would be entirely 
mandatory (except perhaps for a two- or three-year period); but they are 
not completely voluntary, either. In effect, these examples fall into a 
third category—government-aided disclosures (GADs)—that deserves 
study of its own. As Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider do not 
discuss these, I do not know whether they would say that GADs would 
fall within the scope of their argument that “mandatory” disclosures 
almost inevitably fail. 
For now, I will merely note that the pessimism toward disclosures that 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider display may in part arise from this 
same error: the error of excluding government-assisted disclosures from 
their analysis. After all, most disclosure laws operate as floors rather 
than as ceilings, in that they allow any seller who chooses to give the 
disclosed information even greater prominence in their ads, so most 
disclosures have at least the possibility of becoming partly voluntary. To 
be sure, in some cases no seller has any incentive to give the information 
even greater publicity; so in those cases sellers will do no more than the 
bare minimum that the law requires. In other cases, however, some 
sellers will have an incentive to publicize the information even more 
than the law requires, usually with more effective materials than govern-
ment agencies could produce, and a bigger advertising budget than 
government agencies typically command. Thus, when agencies design a 
dynamic disclosure, they should usually hope that the information that 
they mandate is so attractive to consumers (and to sellers whose 
                                                     
70. For further discussions of each of these possibilities, see Beales et al., supra note 6, at 521–
31. 
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products score well on it) that it becomes, in effect, a mere government-
aided disclosure. 
Of course, at the design stage, regulators can rarely be sure they can 
achieve this effect. Just as Broadway producers cannot be sure which of 
their plays will become hits, the designers of disclosure laws cannot be 
sure which of theirs will achieve GAD status. I think it is clear, though, 
that the disclosures most likely to reach GAD status are the ones that 
really mean something to consumers. Advertisers rarely waste their own 
money on promotions that consumers will ignore or will not understand. 
If I am right in this, then when Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider 
exclude from their analysis all disclosures that are merely government 
aided, they systematically exclude the very disclosures that are most 
likely to make a dynamic impact. This, in turn, leads them into what may 
be a simple error about the direction of causation. That is, it may be 
approximately true to conclude, as they do, that mandatory disclosures 
are rarely successful. But it is equally true, and produces perhaps a more 
accurate picture, if we run the causation in the other direction: disclos-
ures that are successful rarely remain entirely mandatory. 
4. Designing More Effective Disclosures 
Finally, the exclusion of all voluntary and government-aided 
disclosures from their analysis may also lead Professors Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider to overlook some of the design features that can contribute to 
a disclosure’s success or failure. For example, when Professors Ben-
Shahar and Schneider acknowledge the “moderate successes” (their 
words) enjoyed by some disclosures that employ rating systems, they 
conclude that the main prerequisite for such success is the simplicity of 
the rating system.71 Of course, this recommendation fits well with their 
earlier diagnosis of the problems that most disclosures face. If 
consumers are being bombarded with information, and are not even 
capable of processing most of it, then presumably only the simplest 
pieces of information can ever make it through the bombardment to 
affect consumers’ decisions. 
While I agree with Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider that 
simplicity is important, I think this overlooks another important factor, 
which is whether the information being disclosed is different for 
different competing firms, or whether all firms are instead required to 
make the same disclosure. The five examples that I discussed earlier—
                                                     
71. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 678–79, 743–45. A similar conclusion was reached 
by Fung et al., supra note 4. 
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Los Angeles restaurant grades, cigarette tar and nicotine ratings, 
automobile mpg ratings, salad dressing fat labels, and the FTC’s 
proposed rating of credit contracts—all disclosed information that varies 
across different firms, depending on their product’s fat content or mpg 
rating or other feature. By contrast, the standard warning that appeared 
on all cigarette packages beginning in 1970 (“Warning: The Surgeon 
General Has Determined that Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your 
Health”) is a uniform disclosure in that it does not vary across firms, 
since all cigarette companies must disclose the exact same warning. 
This distinction is significant because competing sellers, if they have 
any incentive at all to embrace a disclosure and make it partly voluntary, 
are more likely to do that if their disclosure is different from their rivals’. 
For instance, no cigarette company ever went out of its way to publicize 
the Surgeon General’s warning in its own advertising campaigns—and 
why should they, since that warning gave consumers no basis for 
choosing their brand of cigarettes rather than some other? However, 
some cigarette companies did go out of their way to emphasize tar and 
nicotine levels in their advertising campaigns. 
This quasi-voluntary embrace of tar and nicotine information cannot 
be attributed to its greater simplicity, for if there is any difference at all, 
the Surgeon General’s warning is probably the simpler of the two pieces 
of information. (Compare “Cigarettes are bad for your health” with 
“Cigarettes contain something called tar and nicotine, and our brand 
contains them in the following quantities.”) This suggests that the key 
fact in this case was not just the disclosure’s simplicity, but the fact that 
tar and nicotine disclosures were not uniform across different sellers 
(while the Surgeon General’s warning was entirely uniform, down to its 
smallest details). As a result, tar and nicotine levels—unlike the Surgeon 
General’s warning—gave sellers a basis on which to differentiate their 
brands from their rivals’, and thereby gave sellers some reason to spend 
their own money to publicize the new rating system. 
5. Identifying the Costs and Benefits 
Finally, as is often the case, we are left with costs and benefits. The 
preceding subsections have argued that it is possible for dynamic 
disclosures to produce benefits, but they can also produce costs. For 
example if the EPA’s method of calculating mpg is actually inferior to 
some other method, then making that method mandatory (or even 
favoring that method in one of the “softer” ways discussed above) could 
entrench an inferior method of calculation, possibly making consumers’ 
information worse rather than better. 
Successful disclosures could also distort consumer choices in another, 
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more subtle way, if (say) the easy availability of information about fuel 
economy led consumers to place too much weight on that decision and 
too little weight on other, arguably more important factors, such as 
crashworthiness or lifetime maintenance costs. Viewed broadly, this is 
another version of the “teaching to the test” problem, if cars that score 
well on mpg are not necessarily the cars that are best on other, less easily 
observable dimensions.72 
Indeed, this was the ostensible basis for restricting sellers’ use of tar 
and nicotine information during two periods in the 1950s. The concern 
was that consumers might pay so much attention to the relative tar and 
nicotine ratings (since those were what low-tar sellers emphasized in 
their advertising) that they might come to see that dimension as more 
important than it truly was, by not understanding that even low-tar 
cigarettes are still not very safe.73 In the terms used in this Article, this 
would be an example of information that might have positive dynamic 
effects (if it brought down average tar and nicotine levels on the market) 
but negative static effects (if it led consumers to underestimate the 
riskiness of those cigarettes that remained on the market). 
In short, just as we saw earlier in connection with static disclosures, 
dynamic disclosures too can sometimes produce conflicting effects. To 
put it another way, both static and dynamic effects are usually a matter 
of degree, for some effects will be large while others may be small. As a 
consequence, it will often be impossible to label any disclosure a success 
(or a failure) without making the value judgments needed to say whether 
one set of effects outweighs the others. Hopefully, Professors Ben-
Shahar and Schneider’s future work will contribute to our understanding 
of these trade-offs. 
VI. CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS: DISCLOSURE VERSUS QUALITY 
REGULATION 
So far, I have argued that any criteria for evaluating the success or 
failure of disclosures should recognize the different effects that might be 
produced by static versus dynamic disclosures. In this final section, I 
argue that our criteria for success or failure may also have to be adjusted 
depending on what the best alternative is to the disclosure that is being 
evaluated. 
                                                     
72. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
73. Calfee, supra note 45. An alternative hypothesis is that the established cigarette companies 
were beginning to lose market share to the smaller, low-tar companies, so the established firms were 
happy to have comparative tar and nicotine advertising prohibited. 
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More specifically, sometimes when we evaluate a disclosure, we are 
implicitly asking: “Is this disclosure effective enough that we would be 
better off with the disclosure than without it—better off, that is, than we 
would be with no disclosure requirement at all?” At other times, though, 
we may implicitly be asking a different question: “is this disclosure 
effective enough that there is no need to regulate product quality directly 
in this market—that is, would we be better off (a) with the disclosure 
requirement plus no quality regulation, or (b) without the disclosure 
requirement but with quality regulation?” As I discuss below, each of 
these questions implies a somewhat different criterion for saying 
whether a disclosure has “failed.” 
A. Restaurant Grades Revisited 
To illustrate, consider again the system of restaurant hygiene grades 
adopted in Los Angeles County and many other jurisdictions.74 One 
study of their effects in Los Angeles County suggested that the grades 
had produced large and positive dynamic effects by increasing average 
hygiene levels at restaurants throughout the county. On the other hand, 
Daniel Ho’s thorough study of restaurant grading in New York, San 
Diego, and several other cities, found that those regimes had produced 
little or no dynamic effect.75 
Now, it is possible that these varied effects might result from 
problems with the available data. Inadequate restaurant hygiene is most 
likely to make itself felt in the incidence of food poisoning or other 
food-borne disease, but it is hard to get good data on the incidence of 
those health problems, and even harder to link that data to any particular 
restaurant whose food might have caused the problem. As a 
consequence, analysts have had to be creative in finding proxies to 
estimate the health effects, like the total number of hospital admissions 
for food poisoning (even though many of those will have been caused by 
home-cooked foods),76 or the number of Google searches for terms and 
phrases like “food poisoning” or “listeria.”77 
In New York and San Diego, though, Professor Ho found that the 
problems with food grading ran far deeper than a lack of data. In San 
Diego, for example, the cut-offs for the different letter grades had been 
drawn in such a way that 99% of all restaurants got A’s, thus depriving 
                                                     
74. See supra section V.A.2. 
75. Ho, supra note 42. 
76. Jin & Leslie, supra note 40, at 435–36. 
77. Ho, supra note 42, at 645. 
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that grade of any useful comparative content. And in New York, 
Professor Ho found a perfect storm of problems, including (among 
others) these: 
(1) Inspectors are not paid well, so turnover is high, and reports of 
bribery are not uncommon. 
(2) Inspectors do not specialize in restaurant scoring, but are drawn 
from a pool of general-purpose inspectors. 
(3) The forms used by inspectors are complex, and inspectors have a 
great deal of discretion about how to score any given violation. 
(4) The scoring categories listed on the form focus on problems other 
than the ones that modern health experts consider most serious. 
(5) Restaurant hygiene is volatile, so a restaurant that is perfectly 
clean on one day may be dangerously unsafe a few days later (or 
vice versa). 
(6)  A restaurant that (initially) receives a low grade can apply to be 
retested, and only the later grade must be disclosed to the public. 
(7) Inspectors spend quite a lot of their time re-inspecting “B” 
restaurants (who hope re-inspection will raise their grades to an 
“A”); and relatively little time re-inspecting “C” restaurants, who 
are presumably the least hygienic of the bunch. 
In light of all these problems, it is not surprising that New York’s 
restaurant grading program does not appear to have produced any 
positive dynamic effects. If the grades bear only a slight correlation, or 
possibly no correlation at all, to actual restaurant food safety; and if 
“teaching to the test,” in this context, means bribing the local restaurant 
inspector, it would be both surprising and discouraging if consumers did 
pay any attention to New York’s restaurant grades.78 Thus, by any of the 
criteria I have discussed so far, New York’s restaurant grades have to be 
labeled a dynamic failure. 
1. Disclosure Versus No Regulation 
However, even this conclusion (that New York’s restaurant grades 
have failed) may have to be modulated by the question to which that 
conclusion is offered as an answer. Suppose, for example, that New 
York’s city council is considering repealing the restaurant grading 
system; and suppose (for now) that if the repeal passes, the result will be 
                                                     
78. Note, too, that restaurants that get a good grade in New York do not generally build 
advertising campaigns around that fact, the way sellers of low-tar cigarettes or high-mileage 
automobiles have done. In terms of the discussion supra in section V.A.4, New York’s restaurant 
grades have failed to achieve GAD status. 
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no disclosure requirement at all, and no other change in any of the other 
restaurant licensing laws. In other words, this is not a case where the 
council is considering replacing the letter grades with some other form 
of disclosure; nor are they considering replacing their failed disclosure 
policy with much stricter licensing laws, or with any other form of direct 
safety regulation. Instead, in this case the council’s choice is “restaurant 
grades or nothing.” If the choice is narrowed to those two options, 
clearly Professor Ho’s study would support those who preferred 
“nothing,” since New York does not seem to be getting any benefits at 
all from its restaurant grades. This, then, is one criterion by which New 
York’s grades might be deemed a failure. On this view, they are not 
merely bad; they are actually worse than no regulation at all. 
2. Disclosure Versus Direct Quality Regulation 
However, now suppose that the city council is considering a different 
proposal. Rather than continuing to operate an ineffective disclosure 
system, one council member has proposed converting it to a form of 
direct regulation, under which all restaurants that failed to achieve the 
highest possible grade would be shut down. In other words, rather than 
relying on a low grade to shame a restaurant into improving its hygiene; 
and rather than hoping such grades would lead consumers voluntarily to 
other, less risky restaurants; this proposal would take that decision out of 
consumers’ hands (and out of the hands of individual restaurateurs) by 
prohibiting any consumer from eating at a restaurant whose safety and 
hygiene were judged too low. In effect, this is the restaurant equivalent 
of what the FTC did with respect to credit contracts, when it decided that 
no disclosure was likely to achieve the desired dynamic effects, so it 
prohibited some contracts as a matter of law. 
Now suppose that, at a meeting where this proposal is being 
discussed, one of the council members argues that disclosure is generally 
superior to direct regulation, because it allows people to choose where to 
eat. In response, another council member argues that disclosure remedies 
often fail, citing either Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s work on 
disclosure in general, or Professor Ho’s work on New York restaurant 
grades in particular. Clearly, these two council members are disagreeing 
about the effectiveness of disclosures. But is the second council member 
correct, as Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider believe? That is, do the 
problems Professor Ho identified mean that restaurant grades must have 
“failed” by the criteria that are relevant here, when the choice is between 
a problematic disclosure system and direct regulation of restaurant 
hygiene? 
It might seem that the answer is obvious. If the disclosure system has 
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failed so badly that it is worse than no regulation at all (as we concluded 
in the previous subsection), then it might seem that disclosure must also 
be worse than the proposed licensing system that is on the table now. 
However, that conclusion involves a questionable leap, for it ignores the 
possibility that the proposed licensing system might also be worse than 
no regulation at all. 
To put the point more clearly, most of the problems that Professor Ho 
identified do more than limit the gains we can expect from the letter 
grade disclosure system (though they certainly do that). In addition, most 
of those problems also limit the gains we could expect from direct 
quality regulation, such as the proposal to shut down any restaurant that 
fails to achieve the highest grade. After all, if inspectors are corrupt or 
poorly trained, that will cause some good restaurants to be shut down 
under the new licensing system, while allowing bad restaurants to 
survive (if they pay the right bribe). Shutting down low-scoring 
restaurants is also problematic if the criteria on which the scores are 
based do not correspond to the problems that most modern health 
experts consider serious, or if the relation between inspector scores and 
actual health risks is essentially random. True, in theory it might be 
possible to improve New York’s inspection system, to reduce or 
eliminate some of these problems. But if that is the case, it should also 
be possible to adopt those same improvements while retaining the letter 
grade disclosure system, now slightly less problematic because 
improvements have been made. 
In short, the problems that Professor Ho identified are not problems 
that plague disclosure laws alone. Instead, most are problems that would 
plague any form of regulation, whether or not any disclosure is involved. 
As a result, in cases where the relevant choice is not “disclosure or 
nothing” but rather “disclosure or direct quality regulation,” the prob-
lems identified by Professor Ho do not necessarily tip the latter choice in 
either direction. By what criteria, then, should we say in this context that 
New York’s restaurant letter grades have failed? Must we say that we 
are using the term “failed” in a descriptive rather than a normative sense, 
which is not meant to imply anything about whether a “failed” system 
might nevertheless be the best one to vote for (depending on the other 
choices available)? 
3. Asking the Right Question 
A similar point can be made about many of the factors that Professors 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider point to when they explain why (in their 
view) most disclosure laws are likely to fail. As their Article is already a 
long one, the authors understandably do not try to evaluate any of the 
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possible regulatory alternatives to each of the disclosures they discuss.79 
The consequence, though, is that many of the factors they identify are 
similar to those identified by Professor Ho, in the sense that they 
increase the difficulty of direct regulation by just as much as they 
increase the difficulty of disclosures. This gives some of their discussion 
an unintended “Tea Party” flavor, as if what they were really trying to 
show was the failure of all regulation, not just disclosure requirements. 
For example, Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider note that 
disclosure laws are often adopted because of “trouble stories,” or 
publicized disasters where someone dies or loses their home because of 
some choice that might have been prevented by better disclosures.80 In 
these cases, the public often demands that lawmakers “do something” to 
prevent a recurrence, which may lead to the hasty adoption of an ill-
considered disclosure law. But while I agree that this can indeed result in 
too many disclosures (or in not enough effective ones), it seems to me 
that much the same problem also plagues direct regulation, where 
lawmakers are also pressured to act by highly publicized but 
unrepresentative trouble stories. Thus, if this is a problem (and it surely 
is), it is not a problem that changes the relative attractiveness of 
disclosure laws by making them any less likely to be successful than 
direct regulation. 
Or consider one of Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s reasons 
for dismissing the possibility that food nutrition labels had contributed to 
the decline in market share of high-fat salad dressings. After making 
various other arguments, Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider conclude 
by noting the “sobering” fact that, even when people reduce their 
consumption of fat from some sources, they often compensate by 
increasing their fat intake from other foods.81 This is a valid concern, for 
it suggests that the net benefits may perhaps be smaller than would be 
shown by evaluating the changes in fat content from any one product 
alone.82 
My point, of course, is that this same fact also suggests that the net 
benefits of direct quality regulation may also be smaller than would 
otherwise be supposed. That is, if Congress or the FDA, perhaps after 
being persuaded that disclosures rarely if ever work, were to abandon 
                                                     
79. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 742 (“That is too large a question to squeeze into 
the compass of this Article.”). 
80. Id. at 679–80. 
81. Id. at 677. 
82. I will set aside the possibility that some people might prefer to consume whatever fat they 
permit themselves in the form of, say, ice cream rather than salad oil. 
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nutrition labels and simply require salad dressing manufacturers to 
lower their fat content, presumably consumers would still be just as 
inclined to compensate by increasing their intake of other fatty foods. If 
so, then this means consumers’ compensation habits will reduce the 
benefits of disclosures and direct regulation equally, without in any way 
increasing the relative drawbacks of disclosure. 
Indeed, much the same could be said of the other hurdles that 
Professors Schneider and Ben-Shahar identify: 
For mandated disclosure to work, lawmakers must succeed at 
several tasks. First, they must correctly identify a problem that 
needs a regulatory solution. Second, they must correctly decide 
that mandated disclosure is the appropriate regulatory method. 
Third, they must correctly decide what disclosure to mandate. 
Fourth, they must correctly and comprehensively articulate the 
standard of disclosure. Each step is problematic; tackling all four 
successfully is uncommon.83 
While each of these tasks is indeed difficult, they do not seem notably 
harder than the tasks that any direct regulation must accomplish. For a 
lawmaker to get direct quality regulation right, she must first identify a 
problem that needs a regulatory solution, then correctly decide that 
quality regulation is the appropriate regulatory method. After that, the 
lawmaker must decide just what quality the regulation ought to require, 
and then articulate a comprehensive standard defining that quality. 
While it may indeed be hard for lawmakers to successfully navigate all 
four of these tasks, I see no reason why that combination of tasks should 
be any harder (or any easier) when disclosures are involved than when 
they are not. 
In short, there are some contexts where our (often implicit) 
comparison is not between disclosure and no regulation at all, but 
between disclosure and some other form of direct quality regulation. In 
those contexts, the most important aspects of disclosure laws may be 
those that differentially affect disclosure laws and direct quality 
regulations, thus altering the balance between those two regulatory 
strategies. Some of the factors that Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider 
mention do indeed have such a differential effect—for example, 
information overload is likely to limit the effectiveness of disclosure 
laws by more than they limit the effectiveness of direct regulation, since 
direct quality regulation (by definition) spares consumers from 
processing additional information. Hopefully, Professors Ben-Shahar 
                                                     
83. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 679. 
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and Schneider’s future work will illuminate this aspect of the disclosure 
trade-off as well. 
CONCLUSION 
H.L. Mencken once asked his readers to imagine: 
[H]ow distressing fatherhood would become if prospective 
fathers were all taught that the human infant radiates an aroma 
like the rose—if the truth came constantly as a surprise! Each 
fresh victim of the deception would feel that he had been basely 
swindled—that his own child was somehow bogus. Not 
infrequently, I suppose, he would be tempted to make away with 
it in some quiet manner, and have another—only to be shocked 
again.84 
Mencken’s target when he wrote this was politicians, and the 
expectation of many Americans that their politicians should indeed smell 
like roses—“only to be shocked again” each time a new one was elected. 
I quote him here only because what he says about Americans’ attitude 
toward politicians may also be true of their attitudes toward disclosure 
laws. 
That is, people who expect disclosure laws to solve almost every 
problem—quickly, easily, and with very little cost—are doomed to have 
their expectations crushed. The truth is that a successful disclosure law, 
like any other form of regulation, requires lots of difficult work, 
including a careful specification of the purposes the disclosure might 
serve, and careful assessment of all the various effects (both good and 
bad) that most disclosures produce. As a result, those who expect 
disclosures to succeed easily will usually be doomed to disappointment. 
They may feel that they have been “basely swindled,” and they may 
even be tempted to do away with disclosure laws entirely. 
However, one lesson to be drawn from Mencken is the possibility that 
sometimes our disappointment in something is not the fault of the 
object’s inherent unattractiveness, but is rather the fault of the standards 
by which we judge those objects. If we expect good babies to smell like 
roses, then every baby will be judged a failure; and if we expect 
disclosure laws to make people perfectly informed, then every disclosure 
law will fail. The solution, though, is not to do away with disclosures (or 
with babies), but rather to revise the standards by which we judge them, 
employing more realistic expectations. Indeed, as I have argued here, 
                                                     
84. H.L. Mencken, The Politician, in PREJUDICES: FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH SERIES 72, 75 
(1955). 
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different disclosure laws are likely to have different purposes, which will 
place different demands on anyone trying to evaluate the disclosure’s 
success or failure. 
For example, disclosures will succeed at some static purpose if, but 
only to the extent that, they can reduce the number of consumers who 
misperceive the benefits and risks of products presently available on the 
market. By contrast, disclosures with a dynamic purpose will succeed 
only if they increase the number of consumers who accurately perceive 
the differences between those products that are currently available, and 
those products that might be available if market conditions were to 
improve. 
In short, understanding the different possible goals of disclosure is 
essential to any decision about which disclosures “work.” Professors 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider have already illuminated many other aspects 
of disclosure laws. If they can one day articulate (and defend) their own 
criteria for what would count as a “success,” they will advance our 
understanding by even more than they already have. 
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX 
As noted in the text, this model draws heavily on one used by Michael 
Spence.85 Sellers and buyers are both risk-neutral, and sellers produce a 
single product that carries some risk of a defect or injury. Let s represent 
the probability of no defect in any given unit of the product (0 < s < 1), 
so the probability of a defect is 1 – s. I will refer to s as “safety,” though 
it could also refer to non-safety attributes like performance or durability. 
For simplicity, I let s depend only on sellers’ decisions about how to de-
sign or build the product, so consumers’ care decisions can be eliminated 
from the analysis. Consumers can, however, affect the total losses 
(though not the per-unit losses) by their decision of how much of the 
product to purchase. 
Sellers choose both the level of safety they build into their products 
(s) and the per-unit price they charge (p). Sellers’ per-unit production 
costs do not depend on how much they produce (constant marginal 
costs), but production costs do depend on the product’s safety (safer 
                                                     
85. Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure, and Producer Liability, 44 
REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977). It is also similar to one part of Steven Shavell’s model of tort 
rules—specifically, when he models the case where (1) sellers are not liable for injuries their 
customers suffer from product defects; (2) customers are less than perfectly informed about the risk 
of a defect; and (3) customers cannot themselves affect the probability of a defect, except by 
altering the quantity of goods that they purchase. Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12–17 (1980). 
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products are more expensive to produce). Formally, let sellers’ per-unit 
costs be given by c = C(s), with C′(s) and C″(s) both positive to reflect 
positive but decreasing returns from expenditures on safety. I assume a 
competitive market (sellers are price-takers, and consumers have perfect 
information about each seller’s price). Thus, the equilibrium price will 
be competed down until it just barely covers sellers’ production costs, 
using a circumflex to indicate the level of safety ŝ (or the level of any 
other variable) that sellers choose in equilibrium: 
(1) p – C(ŝ) = 0 
Consumers respond to sellers’ choices by choosing the quantity they 
purchase (q). Consumers then learn whether any of the units that they 
purchased are defective. If they are, the consumer who purchased that 
unit suffers a loss L, which is the same for every consumer. (For conven-
ience, I assume consumers are also identical in all other respects, so it is 
sufficient to analyze a single representative consumer). In consumers’ 
utility functions, the loss L is additively separable from the benefits they 
get if there is no defect, so those benefits equal the area under the 
inverse demand curve p = P(q). 
These assumptions let us express overall welfare W as a function of s 
and q: 
(2) W(s,q) = ∫0q  P(z) dz – qC(s) – q (1 – s) L 
The integral on the right side of the equation is a consumer’s expected 
benefit from consuming q units; while the second term, qC(s), is the total 
cost of producing those units. The final term is the expected loss from 
defects, given the number of units consumed. Differentiating over s and 
q yields the following first-order conditions, using asterisks to denote 
socially optimal values: 
(3)  C′(s*) = L 
(4) P(q*) = C(s*) + (1 – s*) L 
These conditions both have familiar interpretations. Equation (3) says 
that sellers, ideally, should raise the level of safety s until the marginal 
cost of further expenditures on safety just equals the marginal gain from 
those expenditures. That marginal gain is simply the loss, L, whose 
probability is reduced by further expenditures on safety. Meanwhile, 
equation (4) says that consumers, ideally, should increase their 
purchases of this product until the marginal benefit from an additional 
purchase just equals the full cost of that purchase. That full cost includes 
the expected losses from defects, (1 – s)L, as well as the direct costs of 
production, C(s). 
In perfect information models, consumers know the exact value of 
every relevant variable. I follow those models in two respects: by 
assuming that consumers know the exact price they pay (p) and the 
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quantity they purchase (q). To introduce imperfect information, I assume 
that consumers do not know the probability that the product will be non-
defective (s). Instead, they know only some estimate r (for “reputation”), 
which may or may not be accurate. 
I will express r as a function r = R(s,d), where d is the level of sellers’ 
disclosure (measured any way you like). However, this function is 
merely a black box: initially, I place no restrictions on the form this 
function can take, or on the exact way in which r varies with s or d. 
Indeed, I mean to include the possibility that R1(s,d) = R2(s,d) = 0, 
meaning that consumer beliefs about safety are completely oblivious to 
both the true level of safety s, and the amount of seller disclosures d. I 
also include the possibility that buyers are always perfectly informed, 
meaning R(s,d) = s for all possible values of s and d. 
If consumers take r (rather than s) to be the probability of no defect, 
they will estimate their net benefits V as: 
(5) V(s,q,d)  = ∫0q  P(z) dz – qC(s) – q (1 – R(s,d)) L 
This is analogous to equation (2) except that, in the final term on the 
right, consumers estimate the probability of no defect as r rather than s. 
Differentiating with respect to q shows that consumers will choose the 
quantity they purchase according to the following first-order condition, 
which is analogous to equation (4): 
(6) P(q) = p + (1 – R(s,d)) L 
At the same time, competition over safety should lead sellers to 
choose the level of s that maximizes the value that buyers think they are 
getting, keeping in mind that imperfectly informed buyers may be wrong 
about what that value is. Formally, sellers choose s to maximize 
equation (4) subject to the constraints represented by equations (5) and 
(1). 
Differentiation now yields the following, slightly different first-order 
conditions: 
(7)  C′(ŝ)  = R1(ŝ,d) L 
(8)  P(q̂)   = C(ŝ) + (1 – r) L 
By comparing these with the conditions for social optimality given 
earlier in equations (3) and (4), we can see two distinct ways in which 
this equilibrium may depart from optimality. 
First, if r > s, a comparison of equations (4) and (8) indicates that 
consumers will purchase too large a quantity of the good. Recall that 
both r and s refer to the probability of no defect, so r > s means that 
consumers underestimate the product’s risks (or overestimate its safety). 
As a consequence, consumers underestimate the true costs associated 
with using this product, and they therefore buy too much. If the opposite 
held (r < s), consumers would overestimate the risks and would buy too 
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little.86 
Second, a comparison of equations (3) and (7) shows that sellers will 
choose too low a level of safety in equilibrium if but only if R1(s,d) < 1. 
Recall that r = R(s,d) is the function that describes how consumers’ 
beliefs about safety, r, respond to changes in the true level of safety, s. If 
consumers were completely ignorant about the true level of s, we would 
have R1(s,d) = 0, and sellers would have no incentive at all to improve 
their products’ safety. If, instead, consumers overreacted to changes in 
safety, we would have R1(s,d) > 1, and sellers would have an incentive to 
produce too much safety. 
These equations also include the special case of perfect information, 
where R(s,d) = s for all values of s and d, implying R1(s,d) = 1 and 
R2(s,d) > 0. In that case, equations (6) and (7) would be identical to 
equations (2) and (3), thus eliminating both of the distortions referred to 
above. 
Notice, though, that these distortions do not both disappear whenever 
consumers accurately perceive the equilibrium levels of risk—that is, 
they do not disappear whenever ̂r = ŝ. True, any distortion of the 
quantity purchased will disappear if  ̂r = ŝ, because that would mean 
consumers accurately perceived whatever level of safety was built into 
the products currently available on the market. However, ̂r = ŝ does not 
preclude the possibility of R1(ŝ,d) < 1, because it is still possible that 
consumers might underestimate any change above or below the level of 
safety that sellers currently offer. In that case, sellers would choose 
inappropriately low (or high) level of safety, in spite of the fact that no 
consumer would be fooled in equilibrium, because ̂r = ŝ implies that 
consumers end up with perfectly accurate estimates of the level of safety 
offered by all sellers in equilibrium. 
Indeed, this is similar in spirit to George Akerlof’s “market for 
lemons,”87 where consumers accurately perceive the average level of 
safety in the market at any given time (̂r = ŝ, in the notation I have used 
here), even though they would not be able to tell if any individual seller 
departed from that equilibrium level. If consumers know only the 
average level of safety, then if one of n sellers increased the safety of its 
products, consumers would react no differently than they would if all 
sellers had increased their safety by a fraction 1/n of that amount. For 
any individual seller, then, Akerlof (in effect) posited R1(ŝ,d) = 1/n < 1, 
which satisfies the condition for sellers to underinvest in safety. 
                                                     
86. In the torts literature, this corresponds to what is sometimes called the “level of activity” 
effect. See Shavell, supra note 85. 
87. Akerlof, supra note 16. 
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Finally, we can now address the effects of increased disclosures. 
Differentiating equation (5) with respect to d shows that, for disclosures 
to correct consumers’ tendency to purchase too much (or too little) of the 
product, the R function would need to have one or both of the following 
properties: 
(9)  R2(s,d)  < 0 for r > s 
                    > 0 for r < s 
In other words, it must be possible for disclosures to reduce 
consumers’ estimates r in cases where those estimates are too high, or to 
reduce r in cases where r is too low. 
By contrast, different characteristics are required for disclosures to be 
capable of correcting sellers’ tendency to produce too low (or too high) a 
level of safety. To correct those problems, the R function will need to 
have one or both of the following properties: 
(10)  R12(s,d)  > 0 for R1(s,d) < 1 
                       < 0 for R1(s,d) > 1 
In other words, if most consumers currently under-respond to changes 
in product safety, disclosures must somehow succeed in magnifying 
their response to any change. And if, instead, consumers currently over-
respond to any change, disclosures must somehow succeed in 
dampening that reaction. 
 
